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Abstract
Marx considered his theory of the falling rate of profit to be one of the most important
discoveries in the field of political economy. According to Marx’s theory, productivity
increases put downward pressure on prices and hence profits. Recurrent crises of capital
devaluation are both the consequence and solution to this pressure, aggravating the loss
of profits initially, but enabling the pursuit of profits via accumulation to once again
ensue. Marx’s argument, however, has been the subject of intense dispute for over a
century. His critics charge that Marx’s thesis is not only improbable but impossible.
This study is an attempt at arbitration of this dispute, inspired by recent quantitative
reinterpretations of Marx’s critique of political economy. In the interest of providing a
detailed review of the theoretical and empirical literature surrounding this issue, I
specifically address the debate about the “transformation” of values into prices.
Resolving this issue not only removes some a priori objections to Marx’s value theory, it
also provides a coherent interpretation of Marx’s falling profit rate thesis. It appears,
then, that the alleged refutations of Marx have themselves been refuted.
In addition to investigating the logical validity of Marx’s argument, I attempt to ascertain
whether and to what extent his argument is supported empirically. I therefore conduct a
multivariate time-series regression analysis of various profit rates in the United States. I
test several partially competing hypotheses concerning the most important determinants
of the profit rate. Most importantly, I operationalize Marx’s concept of value by
calculating an aggregate ratio of total price to total labor hours. I find that accelerating
value accumulation correlates with a falling rate of profit, which is entirely consistent
with Marx’s thesis.
Sociology, knowingly or not, has always been the study of modern society. Because of
this, I suggest that there are certain core processes at work that are necessary for its
reconstitution and which therefore retain a spatial and temporal contiguity. My aim in
this study is to help reclaim for sociology the investigation of one of modern society’s
most fundamental processes: the accumulation of value.
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I. Introduction
This study is about profit as a sociologically useful and relevant concept: what it
is, where it comes from, and how it varies over time. It is an investigation into the most
influential attempt to understand profit to date:

Marx’s value theoretic approach.

According to this theory, profit generation is the primary motivating force of modern
capitalist economies. Profit generation is a juggernaut whose momentum carries us along
for the ride. Profit is also, according to Marx, inherently exploitative. Profit generation
thus entails at once our immiseration and our alienation by social forces that we create
but do not control.
The first part of this study analyzes Marx’s value-theoretic account of profit
generation in capitalist societies, providing a brief account of his value theory and the socalled “transformation problem” that encompasses the relation between value and price.
The solution to this hitherto intractable problem is accomplished, I argue, by a group of
contemporary Marxian scholars who dispense with the sacrosanct assumption of static
equilibrium.

This solution, in turn, has stirred new controversy over the internal

consistency and accuracy of Marx’s famous law of the tendency for the rate of profit to
fall. I review this debate, and endeavor to formally demonstrate that Marx’s conclusions
are indeed consistent with his premises.
The second part of this study investigates the historical trend of various nominal
profit rates in the United States for the past half century. Using a multivariate time series
regression strategy, my goal is to identify the relative importance of several proposed
1

determinants of the profit rate. One of my findings is that the data do not support the
argument that employment levels play a role in the ability of labor to collectively bargain
for a higher wage. In addition, I employ the first time series regression analysis to date
utilizing an independent variable that operationalizes the Marxian concept of the
“monetary expression of labor time,” an aggregate ratio of total price to total labor hours
that enables the conversion of monetary magnitudes into value terms.
My primary finding is that accelerating value accumulation results in a falling rate
of profit. This is entirely consistent with Marx’s falling profit rate thesis. I also find
support for the “realization failure” hypothesis: wages tend to grow slower than the
economy as a whole. Both of these hypotheses have traditionally provided the basis for a
theory of capitalist crisis. In addition, I find no evidence supporting the hypothesis that
falling profit rate trends are due to intensified international competition. These findings
suggest that the antinomy in academic debates between proponents of the realization
failure and falling profit rate thesis is illusory: they are but two descriptions of a single,
more complex process. Social scientists must avoid the temptation to hypostatize value
and to reify economic data more generally.

2

II. Marx’s Value Theory of Labor
Marx begins Capital with an analysis of the commodity, which has both a usevalue and an exchange-value. In societies based upon the capitalist mode of production,
Marx maintains that commodities are no longer primarily objects of utility or
consumption, but exchange-values, or goods and services created and provided for the
explicit purpose of making a profit. Because exchange-value is a social relation, Marx
insists that the commodity is not a natural thing, but a social construct, expressing in
elementary form the wealth of modern societies (1990: 126). The accumulation of
wealth, in other words, appears as the abstract accumulation of value, which in turn
presupposes that labor too, “in so far as it finds its expression in value” possesses both a
use-value and an exchange-value. Marx credits himself with the discovery of this
twofold nature of labor in modern societies, and bases his theory of exploitation upon
their quantitative divergence.
For Marx, labor does not possess value, but creates value. It adds new value in
the production process. Capitalists, however, do not pay for labor, but rather, pay for a
generic capacity to perform labor. Marx refers to this abstract capacity as labor-power.
Labor-power has an exchange-value. It also has a use-value to the capitalist, which is
concrete labor itself. Because commodified labor does not merely produce use-values,
but “use-values for others” (1990: 131), it inaugurates a new principle of social
organization in which “relations of personal dependence” no longer “form the given
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social foundation” and in which “labour and its products . . . assume a fantastic form
different from their reality” (1990: 170).
A surplus arises when the value of a worker’s labor-power is less than the value
that labor produces during production. This difference is called surplus-value, and it is
also the time spent working in excess of the amount of work required to reproduce one’s
livelihood. Surplus-value is thus surplus-labor time and is the exclusive source of profit
in capitalist society, according to Marx.
Capitalists try to increase surplus-value in one of two ways. One way of
increasing surplus-value is to lengthen the working day without a corresponding increase
in labor compensation. Marx refers to this as the production of absolute surplus-value.
Historically, this kind of surplus extraction prevails during the early stages of capitalism,
when production for use initially becomes production for profit under capitalist
ownership. The production process itself remains relatively unchanged. Marx refers to
this early stage of capitalist production as the formal subsumption of labor. Another
method of increasing surplus value is to decrease the necessary labor time needed to
reproduce labor-power. This occurs by cheapening the value of the labor-power
commodity itself by increasing productivity. Marx refers to this as the production of
relative surplus value. Historically, this corresponds to the real subsumption of labor that
begins when capitalists constantly revolutionize the means of production. The production
of relative surplus value thus necessarily entails the mechanization of production.
Although the production of relative surplus value is a defining feature of fully developed,
mature capitalism, the extraction of absolute surplus-value is still extant. An increase in

4

working hours in the US, for instance, over the past few decades is well documented
(Schor 1992).
Marx argues that “what exclusively determines the magnitude of the value of any
article is therefore the amount of labour socially necessary, or the labour-time socially
necessary for its production” (1990: 129). He goes on to define socially necessary labor
time as “the labour-time required to produce any use-value under conditions of
production normal for a given society and with the average degree of skill and intensity
of labour prevalent in that society” (1990: 129). This is one way of saying that less
efficient producers do not generate more value simply by expending more labor time.
Marx distinguishes value, which is determined by labor-time, from both use-value
and exchange-value. The magnitude of use-value corresponds to the physical quantity of
commodities, or material wealth, whereas exchange-value is a commodity’s price, or the
value it receives on the market. Marx’s law of value asserts that value is determined by
the expenditure of socially necessary labor time. Nowhere does Marx argue that labor is
the only source of material wealth. 1 Commentators frequently confuse the two. 2 In fact,
he argues in Capital that use-values are the “combinations of two elements, the material
provided by nature, and labour” (1990: 133). Consequently, there is always a “material
substratum” that is “furnished by nature” (133). And again in the Critique of the Gotha
Program he states emphatically that, “Labour is not the source of all wealth. Nature is

1

By material wealth I mean use-values. These are not necessarily physical objects, however. Marx
stresses that a use-value satisfies a need. Whether this need “arise[s] . . . from the stomach, or the
imagination, makes no difference” (1990: 125).
2
John Roemer, for instance, argues that “labour power as a commodity is not unique in its magical
property of producing more surplus value than it embodies. Indeed, in an economy capable of producing
surplus, any commodity has this magical property” (1989: 100).
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just as much the source of use values (and it is surely of such that material wealth
consists!)” (1978: 525).
Marx’s labor theory of value 3 should not therefore be implicitly understood as an
ahistorical labor theory of wealth. Instead, Marx’s theory is an attempt to answer the
question: “Why is labor represented by the value of its product and labor-time by the
magnitude of that value?” (1990: 80). For this reason, Raya Dunayevskaya (1988: 138)
argues that Marx’s labor theory of value should instead be called a “value theory of
labor” because “the process of production has mastery over man, instead of the opposite”
(1976: 174-75). Value, or wealth in the abstract, is for Marx “an automatic subject”
(1990: 255) and the “sole driving force” (1990: 254) that animates the circuit of capital,
whereby money is transformed into commodities and back into money again, or M-C-M’.
It is for this reason that Ollman (1979) writes that abstract labor not only creates value,
value as a condition creates abstract labor. Marx’s project is an attempt to understand
how the logic of capital becomes a “self-moving substance” (1990: 256) that acts over
and against the individuals that collectively produce it. In other words, his critique of
political economy is fundamentally a critique of alienation understood as a process of
fetishization. 4
Marx writes that exchange-value is the “necessary mode of expression, or form of
appearance” that value necessarily takes in modern societies. Value, which is determined
by labor time, is the essence of exchange-value. Essence, however, does not mean

3

Marx never uses this phrase. Instead, he called it “the law of value”, or the “determination of value by
labor-time.”
4
John Holloway (2002) distinguishes between two understandings of the fetish: hard fetishism and
fetishization-as-process (29). The former understands fetishism as an “established fact” whereas the later
understands it as a “continuous struggle” (29).
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ineffable or mysterious. As Derek Sayer points out, by essential relations, Marx simply
means those “conditions of existence of the phenomenal forms” that explain “why
phenomena should take such forms” (1979: 9). They are the preconditions for the
manifest forms. By saying that value is the essence of exchange-value, Marx is in effect
stating that the precondition of the monetary commensuration of commodities, as it exists
in its historical specificity, is the social commensuration of human activity in the form of
socially necessary, abstract labor. Consequently, abstract labor does not refer to an
arbitrary subjective mental classification, but rather, to an objective historical process of
commensuration. He states that, “although an abstraction this is a historical abstraction
which could only be adopted on the basis of a particular economic development of
society” (1941: 106). 5
Marx refers to this new, self-mediating principle of social organization as the law
of value. This law describes the “historical abstraction” that establishes new
dependencies upon quasi-objective, impersonal social structures. A society governed by
the law of value is one in which,
“all the different kinds of private labor are continually being reduced to the quantitative
proportions in which society requires them. The reason for this reduction is that in the midst of
the accidental and ever-fluctuating exchange relations between products, the labour-time socially
necessary to produce them asserts itself as a regulative law of nature” (1990: 168).

5

This is the crucial difference between Marx and his early critics such as Eugen von Bohm-Bawerk who
proposed instead that abstract utility was the common substance found in all commodities. The idea that all
commodities possess utility is accurate in the sense that they all possess a use-value, but it is an ahistorical
concept that does not grasp the preconditions of production for exchange.

7

Interpreting Marx Quantitatively
Mathematical formalizations of Marx’s theory are in fact implicit interpretations of
his theory that presuppose certain concepts that Marx may or may not have shared. The
primary justification for the exclusion of Marxian value theory from economics and
sociology 6 , is based upon a specific quantitative interpretation of Marxian value theory
that failed to make sense of Marx’s work, and therefore dismissed it as internally
inconsistent. I will show, in this section of the paper, that subsequent scholarship has
refuted these allegations.
Marx’s project is not primarily quantitative, since he was most concerned with
bringing about qualitative social transformation, but it is true that Marx’s value theory
posits several determinate quantitative relationships. For Marx, all new value is created
solely by living labor. Workers, however, receive only a portion of the value they
produce, which is equivalent to the value of labor-power. Marx refers to the money
advanced by capitalists to acquire labor-power as variable capital. He refers to the
money advanced to acquire machines and other non-labor inputs as constant capital. The
difference between the value of the output and the value of inputs (variable and constant
capital) is called surplus-value. Surplus-value is also the difference between the value

6

The perhaps best exemplified by the American Journal of Sociology symposium on exploitation in 2000,
where Aage B. Sorenson rejected Marx’s value theory as an adequate basis because “it was abandoned long
ago” (1524) and also because “the hidden source of the exploitation makes it impossible to use empirically”
(1529). He proposes instead that a concept of exploitation be based upon the (equally unobservable)
neoclassical concept of rent, which occurs whenever prices depart from their imaginary equilibrium
magnitude. What is most interesting, however, about this symposium is that all participants, including the
noted Marxian economist Erik Olin Wright, agreed, without providing explicit reasons, that Marx’s labor
theory of value is fundamentally flawed, outdated, and in need of replacement.
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produced by living labor and the value of labor-power, and the difference between
necessary and surplus labor-time.
The value of outputs equals the sum of these inputs:

1) C + V + S =Value of outputs
2) L=V+S

In equation 2, L refers to living labor, V to variable capital, and S to surplus-value. C is
constant capital, which, according to Marx, transfers its pre-existing value, but does not
generate any new value. Marx refers to the ratio of C to V as the organic composition of
capital. 7 In modern terms, it is the capital to labor ratio. As the organic composition of
capital rises, the relative portion of available surplus falls. The rate of exploitation is
given by the ratio S/V, and the Marxian rate of profit is the amount of surplus extracted
over total investments (both constant and variable capital):

3) Rv=S/(C+V)

In keeping with Marx’s famous circuit of capital M-C-M’, the rate of profit can also be
thought of as M/M’, the ratio of the original money advanced to the money received
(Sweezy 1970: 141).

7

The organic composition can also be thought of as c/(c+v), the ratio of constant capital to total capital
(Sweezy 1970: 66).

9

Marx concluded that, at the aggregate level, the value rate of profit given in
equation 3 strictly determined the aggregate price rate of profit, given in equation 4.

4) Rp=P/(C+V)

K here refers to the sum total of capital stocks and investments, which include money
advanced to acquire labor. For Marx, this means that profits ultimately depend upon the
extraction of surplus value from living labor. Marx writes that, “the average rate of profit
is nothing other than total surplus value related to and calculated on this total capital”
(1991: 104). In addition to the aggregate equality of the value and price rates of profit,
Marx calculated two additional aggregate equalities: total profit equals total surplusvalue, and total price of production 8 equals total value.
Marx’s aggregate equalities account for the fact that profit rates tend to equalize
across sectors of the economy with varying organic compositions. An industry that
employs more labor does not necessarily receive higher profits. Assume two industries
with equal rates of surplus value (S/V), equal amounts of advanced capital (C+V), and
different organic compositions. If industry A has 90 units of constant capital and 10 units
of variable capital, and the rate of surplus extraction is 50 percent, then the total value
produced is 90+10+5=105. Industry B, however, has 50 units of constant capital and 50
units of variable capital. Again, assuming an equal rate of surplus extraction at 50
percent, the total value produced is 50+50+25=125. It would therefore seem that industry

8

Price of production for Marx is simply the cost of inputs, which he calls cost-price, plus the average rate
of profit.

10

B would be more profitable. In the real world, however, profit rates tend to equalize.
Assuming a general or average profit rate of 20 percent, the value received by each
industry would equal the total capital advanced, 100, plus the 20 percent mark-up, or 120
units of value. Industry B would therefore receive less value than it produces, whereas
industry A would receive more value than it produces. Differences in the organic
composition of capital therefore “prevent goods from exchanging in proportion to their
values, even in equilibrium” (Sowell 1985: 122). Marx argues that the values of
individual commodities will, in general, not equal their prices, stating that:
The possibility, therefore, of a quantitative incongruity between price and magnitude of value, i.e.
the possibility that the price may diverge from the magnitude of value, is inherent in the priceform itself. This is not a defect, but, on the contrary, it makes this form the adequate one for a
mode of production whose laws can only assert themselves as blindly operating averages between
constant irregularities (1990: 198).

The market is therefore the mechanism by which the redistribution of pre-existing value
takes place.
The conventionally defined rate of profit is:

5) R=p/K

p is annual profits received in a given year, and K is total capital stock.
same as Marx’s price rate of profit, P/(C+V).

It is the

The profit rate can be further

decomposed into:

6) p/K = (p/Y) (Y/K)

11

Y is equal to total annual output, or income. p/Y is known as the profit share. One
minus the profit share can be thought of as labor’s share of income. Y/K is the outputcapital ratio. Its inverse has been used as an empirical proxy for the organic composition
of capital, as defined by C/L because total net output, Y, is the product of living labor, L.
It is also sometimes referred to as the maximum profit rate 9 since Y would equal profits
if wages were zero (assuming maximum capacity is being utilized). To test capacity
utilization effects, the output-capital ratio itself can be decomposed:

7) R= (p/Y) (Y/Z) (Z/K)

Here p/Y is the profit share, Y/Z is the rate of capacity utilization, and Z/K is the capacity
capital ratio. The latter variable, the capacity capital ratio, can be further decomposed
into:

8) Z/K = (Zr/Kr)(Py/Pk)

Zr and Kr are capacity and capital values in “real” or constant dollars. A current dollar is
equal to a constant dollar multiplied by the price index for particular year. Py and Pk
therefore refer to the separate price indices for output and fixed capital assets.

9

The Russian mathematician George von Charasoff first pointed out in 1910 that any increase in the
organic composition of capital reduces the maximum possible profit rate, since if wages are zero, the rate of
profit is s/c, “the inverse of the ratio of dead to living labor” (Howard and King 1992: 131).
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The Value Price Transformation

The preceding quantitative exposition is generally accepted without reservation.
Real disagreements, however, arise over the question of how the values of constant and
variable capital are actually determined. According to the traditional interpretation that
prevailed for nearly a century, the values of inputs are determined simultaneously with
the values of outputs, so that they are necessarily equal. In addition, prices and values
constitute separate systems. According to the traditional view, however, Marx’s value
theory is “internally inconsistent” and therefore necessarily false. 10
The most influential alleged proof of internal inconsistency is that of Ladislaus
von Bortkiewicz (1952), who between 1906 and 1907 wrote four essays asserting that a
society in which the law of value prevailed would not be able to reproduce itself. It is
noteworthy that Bortkiewicz considered himself a Marxian economist. Paul Sweezy later
popularized his argument in 1942 with the publication of A Theory of Capitalist
Development. The crux of the argument is straightforward. Assume that Department I
produces machines, or constant capital inputs, for all other sectors of the economy.
Assume that Department II produces the means of subsistence, or consumer goods, for
workers in all industries. Finally, Department III produces luxury goods for capitalists to
consume. Department I is, unsurprisingly, more capital intensive than the other two. To

10

The importance of the question of internal inconsistency is asserted forcefully by Kliman: “Internally
inconsistent theories may be appealing, intuitively plausible and even obvious, and consistent with all
available empirical evidence- but they cannot be right. It is necessary to reject them or correct them. Thus
the alleged proofs of inconsistency trump all other considerations, disqualifying Marx’s theory at the
starting gate. . . . The reclamation of Capital from the myth of inconsistency is therefore an absolutely
necessary and vital precondition to any efforts to reclaim it in more ambitious ways” (2007: 3).
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simplify matters, assume also that one hour of socially necessary labor-time represents $1,
which represents one physical quantity of output.
For Bortkiewicz, the values of inputs are “transformed” by Marx into output
prices. In order for the system to reproduce itself, the value of outputs must equal the
value of inputs. I demonstrate his reasoning in Table 1 using an adapted version of an
example given by Paul Sweezy (1970: 113). Bortkiewicz assumes an average profit rate
of 33% across all sectors. The output prices, which Marx refers to as prices of production,
for individual industries are therefore given by the equation C+V+.33(C+V). This is the
price of inputs plus the average profit rate markup.
The problem for Bortkiewicz is that the values of the inputs to production do not
equal the prices of the outputs. For instance, workers are paid 200 yet the price of what
they consume is only 166. Sweezy writes that this result “could be justified only if we
were to make the assumption that workers accumulate capital to the extent of 33 1/3 out
of their incomes” (1970: 115). Moreover, the equality of total price and total value at
800 is a mere accident of the numbers, and does not hold generally. Sweezy therefore
reasons that, “only one conclusion is possible, namely, that the Marxian method of
transformation is logically unsatisfactory” (1970: 115). From here, he calculates, using
simultaneous equations, what the prices would have to be in a hypothetical equilibrium
economy.
This mathematical formalization assumes that output prices must equal input
prices. Because of this, it is a simultaneous interpretation. It also assumes that values
must be transformed into prices. Values and prices thus constitute separate accounting
systems and the problem is therefore to translate or map one system onto the other. It is
14

therefore also a dual-system interpretation. These two assumptions are usually justified
by invoking the concept of equilibrium, which, according to a standard economics
textbook, refers to a “constellation of selected interrelated variables so adjusted to one
another that no inherent tendency to change prevails in the model which they constitute”
(Fritz 1958: 9). Yet, describing a situation in which there is “no inherent tendency to
change” is quite at odds with Marx’s project to “lay bare the economic law of motion of
modern society” (1990: 10). Those who interpret Marx as an equilibrium theorist
emphasize capitalism’s ability to reconstitute itself, conflating non-equilibrium with
social collapse. As I will demonstrate below, however, non-equilibrium models can also
account for society’s reproduction. In fact, simple reproduction or stasis is merely a
special case of motion. Marx’s value theoretic approach can account for both.
In the past few decades, Marxian scholars have challenged the interpretive
validity of both simultaneous valuation and dual-system determination. Proponents of
the so-called New Interpretation (NI), single-system interpretations (SSI), and temporal
single-system interpretations (TSSI) all arose concurrently in the 1980s (Kliman 2007:
52). The NI (Dumenil 1980; Foley 1982) challenges Bortkiewicz’s dual system
interpretation of the value of labor-power, but not the dual-system interpretation of
constant capital. SSI’s (Wolff, Roberts, and Callari 1982; Lee 1993; Moseley 1993)
question the dual-system interpretation of both constant and variable capital, and because
of this, they are able to preserve all three of Marx’s aggregate equalities. SSI’s do not,
however, derive Marx’s conclusion about falling profit rates.
TSSI’s were first proposed by those working on the transformation problem
(Perez 1980; Carchedi 1984) and subsequently used to defend (Ernst 1982) Marx’s Law
15

of the Tendential Fall in the Rate of Profit (LTFRP). It first became collectively and selfconsciously articulated, however, with the publication of Marx and Non-Equilibrium
Economics in 1996, a collection of essays edited by Alan Freeman and Guglio Carchedi.
I will devote most of my attention to the TSSI because it is the only quantitative
interpretation of Marx’s value theory that has successfully deduced all of Marx’s
conclusions from his premises. The TSSI successfully preserves all three aggregate
equalities, and also successfully defends the consistency of Marx’s falling profit rate
thesis. Because of this, the TSSI meets hermeneutical standards of textual interpretation,
specifically, George Stigler’s (1965) principle of scientific exegesis which states that, in
short, an interpretation that is able to make sense of the text is the correct interpretation.
The TSSI does just that.
Along with SSI’s, the TSSI maintains that the values of constant and variable
capital are determined by the amount of money needed to acquire them. Value and price
are not separate systems that have to be mapped onto one another, but are instead,
mutually constituted. Unlike other SSI’s, however, the TSSI maintains that the prices of
inputs do not equal the prices of outputs. The prices of outputs, in other words, are the
prices of inputs at the beginning of a subsequent cycle of production. Instead of relying
on simultaneous equations that posit that goods are sold at the prices at which they were
previously purchased, the TSSI employs a sequential model of determination. This alone
is sufficient to refute the allegation of internal inconsistency. My TSS solution 11 to Table
1 is provided in Table 2. The only difference is that Table 2 includes two production
periods rather than one.
11

The refutation is my own, but the method behind the refutation is explained by Kliman (2007: chapter 9).
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It is first important to remember that both years 1 and 2 represent the same
physical quantity of goods. Only their values have changed. In addition, I assume that
workers work for the same duration and intensity in each time period. The amount of
new value added in production is therefore set by the amount of living labor performed,
and is equal to 400 in both time periods. This is provided by the equation L=S+V. The
sum total of S and V in Period 1 is 400. I therefore maintain this sum in Period 2 for
consistency.
Because the price of the original 400 units of constant capital has risen to 433 at
the end of period 1, the total cost of these 400 units equals 433 at the beginning of period
2. Each individual unit of constant capital therefore costs 433/400, or 1.08. Likewise,
the individual unit cost of consumer goods is 166/200, or .83. Consumer goods are
therefore cheaper than before, while the means of production are more expensive.
Because this model assumes simple reproduction, the same physical quantity of constant
and variable capital is purchased as before in each industry. The prices paid by each
industry for constant capital is therefore equal to the per-unit price of constant capital
times the physical quantity of constant capital. The per-unit price is simply the ratio of
the price at the end of period 1 to the total value at the beginning of period 1. For
example, because each unit of constant capital costs 1.08 at the end of period 1, Industry I
spends a total of 1.08*250=270 on constant capital at the beginning of period 2.
Likewise, because each unit of variable capital costs .83 at the end of period 1, Industry I
spends a total of .83*75=62.25 on variable capital at the beginning of period 2, and so on.
The same amount of new value, however, is generated in period 2 because the
same amount of labor is employed. Because consumer goods are cheaper, however, less
17

money is needed to hire labor-power. The difference between the total amount of value
produced and variable capital is, as always, surplus-value. The rate of surplus-value, S/V,
has consequently risen from 100 percent to 140 percent. In addition, the total value of the
economy has risen from 800 to 832 because of the value transferred to constant capital
from the previous production cycle. Simple reproduction has occurred, thus refuting
Bortkiewicz’s allegation of internal inconsistency.
Notice, however, that the rate of profit, given by the equation S/(C+V), has
actually risen from 33 percent to roughly 39 percent. This is a result of the stipulation
that the prices of inputs equaled their values in the beginning of period 1. When this
production process is extended to subsequent cycles in a process called iteration, the
profit rate actually falls, so long as the magnitude of living labor remains constant.
Table 2 also demonstrates that the prices of outputs diverge from their original
input values, and that these prices then subsequently determine the values of the outputs.
The order of determination between prices and values is sequential and cyclical:

9) Input prices¹ Æ Output values¹ Æ Input prices² Æ Output values². . .

In other words, the value of inputs is given by their price. Because total price equals, for
Marx, total value in labor hours, any fraction of this total monetary value equals a
proportional fraction of total value. TSSI authors therefore employ a conversion factor
between price and value magnitudes, and call it the Monetary Expression of Labor Time
(MELT). The MELT is simply the ratio of the total money price (=value) of output to the
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total labor-time value of the output. 12 Consequently, any price can be converted into a
labor-value at any given time, and vice versa. Yet, price and value are also distinct,
because the output value is determined before it goes to market. 13 Its value is thus
determined by the value represented by the money spent on constant capital inputs plus
the value added by living labor. Once a commodity is sold on the market, however, it
will almost always sell above or below its value. The market price system circulates
these values, but does not alter the total aggregate magnitude of value, which only grows
when production once again ensues.

12

This particular way of explaining the MELT was provided to me by Andrew Kliman in personal
correspondence. Incidentally, the MELT can be used to give precise meaning to a Marxian concept of
exploitation. Surplus-value is simply the difference between the hours a worker works and the value of the
wage-bill. For example, if the MELT is $50/hour and the weekly wage is $500, a worker receives the
equivalent of 10 hours of labor. If this worker works 40 hours per week, then the worker expends 30 hours
of surplus-labor. The rate of exploitation would consequently be 30/10, or 300 percent.
13
Marx writes, “the value of a commodity is expressed in its price before it enters circulation, and it is
therefore a pre-condition of circulation, not its result” (1990: 260).
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III. Marx’s Value Theoretic Explanation of Crises

The Temporal Single-System defense of Marx’s falling rate of
profit thesis
Karl Marx famously posited his “law of the tendential fall in the rate of profit”
(LTFRP) in volume 3 of Capital. In his notebooks, collectively entitled the Grundrisse,
he calls this law “in every respect the most important law of modern political economy”
(1973: 748). The idea of a falling rate of profit, however, was not new. Classical
political economists such as Smith, Ricardo, Malthus, and Mill had all predicted that
capitalism would eventually slow down and lapse into a “stationary state with a zero rate
of accumulation” (Harvey 1999: 177). With the exception of Smith, however, classical
political economists had located the cause of the decline in factors external to capitalism.
Ricardo, for instance, argued that declining productivity was the inevitable result of
population growth because increasingly less fertile agricultural land would have to be
utilized. This would raise the costs of food, which in turn would raise wages and squeeze
profits. Marx was scathing in his critique of this idea, saying that Ricardo “flees from
economics to seek refuge in organic chemistry” (1973: 754). Marx differs from his
classical predecessors because he identifies the falling rate of profit as an endogenous
self-destructive tendency of capitalist economies.
Marx’s LTFRP states that a rising organic composition of capital, all other things
equal, will result in a falling profit rate. Marx reasoned as follows: since all new value,
20

including surplus-value, is created solely by living labor, the less living labor contributes
to the production process, the less surplus there is available for extraction by capitalists.
Because of capitalism’s inherent drive to revolutionize the means of production, human
labor is increasingly replaced by machines, which results in a rising organic composition
of capital, which in turn depresses the rate of profit. Marx’s argument can be summarized
using simple algebra (Howard and King 1992: 128)

1) K=C/V
2) E=S/V
3) R=S/(C+V)

The organic composition of capital is K; E is the rate of exploitation; and E is the (value)
rate of profit. Dividing both the numerator and denominator of S/(C+V) by V yields the
following:
4) R=E/(K+1)

Equation 4 states that the profit rate will rise with an increase in the rate of exploitation,
and will fall with a rise in the organic composition of capital. All that is necessary for the
profit to fall, however, is for the organic composition of capital to rise at a faster rate than
exploitation.
There is some dispute over the meaning of Marx’s LTFRP. As Harvey notes,
Marx himself identified several counteracting influences to the law, including: “ (1) a
rising rate of exploitation; (2) falling costs of constant capital (which checks the rise in
21

value composition); (3) depression of wages below the value of labor-power; and (4) an
increase in the industrial reserve army (which preserves certain sectors from the ravages
of technological progress by lessening the incentive to replace labour power by
machines)” (1999: 178). Are these counteracting influences, then, able to stabilize the
average profit rate, or does the LTFRP predict that it falls permanently? Furthermore,
what is the relationship between his LTFRP and capitalist crises?

Finally, if there is a

connection between the two, does the LTFRP predict the collapse of capitalism, or
recurrent crises that it can overcome?
These questions are disputed in the literature. Howard and King (1992), for
instance, argue that Marx predicts that, “the rate of profit must eventually decline”
despite these counteracting influences. They argue that he relates the falling rate of profit
to cyclical crises of increasing severity, but does not clearly specify the causal link
between the two. Likewise, David Harvey (1999: 179) argues that Marx at least gives
the impression that the tendential law predicts an empirical trend when he makes
statements about capitalism’s inevitable collapse. Still other authors (Geert 1991; Kliman
2007) argue that Marx does not predict that the rate of profit will fall inexorably: “his
LTFRP in fact predicts recurrent economic crises that restore profitability- largely by
means of the cheapening of the means of production- rather than a falling trend in the rate
of profit” (Kliman 2007: 44).
In addition, it would be difficult to discern any trends because available economic
data do not correspond to Marxian categories. Harvey (1999) points out that, for instance,
that surplus-value, the numerator of Marx’s value rate of profit, is distributed not only as
profits, but as rents, interest, taxes, and so on. Nor does this law take into account the
22

importance of turnover times in the determination of the profit rate. 14 Other authors
(Moseley 1985, 1992; Shaikh and Tonak 1994) argue that surplus is also distributed in
the form of compensation to unproductive labor, or capitalistically employed labor that
consumes rather than produces use-values. 15 Examples of non-productive labor include
military personnel, security guards, lawyers, bankers, and advertisers. Presumably, then,
a Marxian profit rate would have to include the compensation paid to employees engaged
in non-productive activities as part of its numerator.

Because surplus-value is not

exclusively distributed as profits, surplus-value can rise while profits fall, and vice-versa.
Marx acknowledges that the profit rate might fall for other reasons, the most
important factor being the rise in real wages brought about by class struggle. His LTFRP,
however, predicts that the rate of profit will fall even when these other important factors
remain constant. Still, the LTFRP is an entirely abstract law that assumes, among other
things, a society with two classes 16 and an entirely closed capitalist economy. The law,
therefore, does not take into account military conquest, or other extra-economic
influences that might affect the rate of profit. For this reason authors such as Robert
Albritton (1999) and Michael Lebowitz (2003) stress that Capital should not be read as a

14

Harvey argues that, “without a common measure of turnover time, there can be no equalization of profit
rates because there would be no standard against which to determine whether the profit rate was higher or
lower than average, or even rising of falling” (1999: 187). He proposes that the credit system and the
interest rate are necessary to provide the common standard of “socially necessary turnover time” (187).
15
The distinction does not rely on whether a certain kind of labor is necessary or not. Non-productive
labor may be necessary in that it produces socially necessary outcomes, but it does not produce output.
Moreover, non-productive workers are exploited like other workers. Moseley (1985, 1992) argues that a
falling productive labor to non-productive labor ratio is a primary cause of the falling rate of profit in the
United States. David Harvie in his aptly entitled (2005) essay “All Labour Produces Value For Capital and
We All Struggle Against Value”, vehemently opposes this distinction, arguing that all abstract labor
produces value.
16
Marx, however, frequently discusses other classes, such as the landowners, the peasants, the pettybourgeoisie, and even the lumpen-proletariat. He thought, however, that capitalism increasingly split
society into the two antagonistic classes mentioned above.
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blueprint for history, but as an account of the abstract logic of self-expanding value.
Albritton thus argues that Marx makes no empirical predictions whatsoever with his
LTFRP, and that it expresses merely the abstract end of capitalism. This is the fate that
capitalism would meet if it were to unfold according to its own logic without outside
interference. Because society is never completely dominated by this logic, however, this
self-destruction does not materialize (1999). Marx’s Capital is not intended to describe a
totality in the Hegelian sense because at least one of its preconditions is not determined
by the system itself, and it is therefore not entirely closed. Because the value of laborpower always “contains a historical and moral element” (1990: 275), it is not determined
entirely by the market. Lebowitz (2003) argues that because the value of labor-power is
determined in the process of class struggle, an extrinsic and antagonistic logic necessarily
resists the reifying power of capital (Lebowitz 2003). 17
Albritton’s argument that the LTFRP only expresses an abstract necessity
implicitly relies on the assumption that the profit rate would in fact fall if capitalism were
left to its own devices. Critics, however, have argued forcefully that there is no reason to
assume that this is the case. Marx argues that the tendency of the rate of profit to fall
arises from a rising organic composition of capital, all other factors being equal, and he
identifies this rising organic composition of capital with rising productivity. Furthermore,
rising productivity is the result of the pursuit of relative surplus value and is therefore
endogenous to Marx’s model of capitalism. Capitalists, however, do not introduce new
technologies unless by doing so they can raise their profit rates. Increased productivity

17

It is unclear, though, which social logics would save capitalism from itself. Certainly it would not be the
logic of wage-labor.
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should raise the profit rate because more outputs can be generated per unit of input. In
short, labor-saving technical improvements must, according to Marx’s critics, necessarily
raise the general rate of profit.
The argument that cost-reducing innovations increase the profit rate has a long
history. 18 In 1899 both the Italian Benedetto Croce and the Ukrainian Mikhail TuganBaranovsky argued that rising productivity entailed a reduction in the value of constant
capital, thus offsetting the tendency for the organic composition to rise. Karl Kautsky
charged Tugan of committing a “fallacy of composition” by assuming that the results of
individual actions could not lead to opposite aggregate effects, but he neglected to
address squarely the issue of whether rising productivity raises or lowers the profit rate.
Later, Ladislaus von Bortkiewicz attempted to rigorously prove their assertions.
In general, Marx’s critics went unanswered. Advocates simply presumed the
logical coherence of Marx’s LTFRP, while others, such as Kautsky, Rosa Luxembourg,
and Rudolf Hilferding, preferred to explain economic crises in terms of underconsumption, rather than as the result of a rising organic composition of capital. Later,
Natalie Moszkowska (1929), Japanese economist Kei Shibata (1934), and neoclassical
economist Paul Samuelson (1957) developed more rigorously the original insights of
Croce and Tugan. Their efforts culminated in the Okishio Theorem (1961), according to
which, it is not only implausible, but impossible for the rate of profit to fall given
technical progress and a constant real wage. Okishio’s model was later extended by
Roemer (1981) to include fixed capital.

18

Much of the material for next three paragraphs is taken from Howard and King (1992: chapter 7).
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Despite these a priori logical objections, some recalcitrant Marxian theorists
made the LTFRP a central element of their crisis theories.

The first to make this

connection explicitly was Erich Preiser, who rejected interpretations of Marx as an
underconsumptionist. Henryk Grossman later echoed this position, arguing that Marx’s
materialist conception of history required that capitalist breakdowns be located in the
sphere of production. He argued in addition that Marx’s law predicted capitalism’s
inevitable collapse. Ernst Mandel’s Late Capitalism (1975), an empirical work, seemed
to take Marx’s law for granted, while other authors, such as David Yaffe (1973) of the
“capital-logic” school explicitly defended Marx’s LTFRP, without, unfortunately,
defending its logical coherence. Only recently, have TSSI scholars provided logical
refutations of the Okishio Theorem, thus demonstrating the internal coherence of Marx’s
argument.
In order to explain the principle of Okishio’s Theorem, I will use Natalie
Moszkoswka’s example of the limiting case, “where capitalists are indifferent between
old and new techniques because the net saving in labor value is zero” (Howard and King
1992: 133). Howard and King (1992) and Alan Freeman (2000) discuss her example at
length. I include the original numbers used by these authors, but also extend the model to
include a third year.
Moszkoswka assumes a single-sector economy where the only thing that is
produced is corn.

Workers are only paid one-half of their working day, so the rate of

exploitation is 100 percent. Workers therefore consume only half of the net output.
Assume for simplicity that 1 labor hour produces one unit of corn, which is worth $1.
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The physically determined profit rate is the ratio of net corn output to total corn input, or
more precisely,

5) P=(Corn output-Corn inputs-Corn wages)/(Corn inputs + Corn Wages)

A scenario of rising physical productivity is depicted in Table 3. For clarification, and
keeping with Moszkoswka’s model, I have indicated the total amount of living labor
performed in each year, which remains constant at 340.
Table 3 demonstrates that a rise in productivity does not cause the (physical) rate
of profit to fall. Instead, it remains constant at 50 percent. The output of year 2 could
have been achieved with the old technology by increasing both corn and labor by 50
percent, yielding:

6) 255 corn + 510 labor Æ 765 corn 19

Howard and King therefore note that,
it is evident that the process uses 85 more tons of corn, with a value of 85, and 170 fewer workers;
with the value of labour-power equal to one-half, this represents a savings of 85 units of labour
value in the payments of direct labour. Thus the extra labour embodied in the new means of
production is exactly equal to the saving in paid labour which the new technique allows, when the
labour values of the original technique are use to make the comparison” (1992: 134).

In year 2 constant capital inputs double, or rise by 100 percent, yet corn output rises by
150 percent. Importantly, if productivity had increased beyond this, the rate of profit
19

The arrow symbolizes production. It is commonly used in the literature. I do not use an equal size
because the sum of 255 and 510 does not equal 765. This is at the heart of the TSSI objection to use-value
valuation.
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would have actually risen. Something similar happens in year 3. Constant capital input
rises, but the output rises even more. In year 1 the organic composition of capital is 1. In
year 2 it’s 2, and in year 3 its 3. Because the profit rate has not fallen, Marx’s LTFRP is
ostensibly refuted.
Notice, however, that in each year the value of corn is strictly determined by the
physical quantity of corn. This presumes that the input prices equal the output prices for
each period.

It therefore flatly contradicts Marx’s premise that, “the same labour,

therefore, performed for the same length of time, always yields the same amount of value,
independently of any variations in productivity” (1990: 137, emphasis added). The
output of year 1 is 510, which is then advanced to acquire 510 units of input (340 units of
constant capital and 170 variable capital). The output of year 2, however, exceeds the
sum of the seed corn input and the living labor performed. Because the amount of living
labor performed remains constant at 340, the value of the output, if it is to be determined
by labor time, must be 340+340=680. The 765 units of corn should therefore have a
value of 680, so that each unit of corn equals not $1, but about 89 cents. Likewise, in
year 2 the total amount of value equals 850 (510 units of constant capital plus the 340
units of new value added by living labor). The 1020 units of output should therefore
equal 850, and the per-unit value of corn should have fallen to around 83 cents. Table 4
demonstrates in a simplified manner the refutations of the Okishio Theorem developed by
proponents of the TSSI (Freeman and Carchedi 1996; Freeman 1999; 2000; Kliman 1996,
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1999, 2007; Kliman and Freeman 2000; Ramos-Martinez 2004). Table 4 defends Marx
by illustrating that labor-saving technologies can cause the general rate of profit to fall. 20
Another way of arriving at physicalist conclusions, while giving the impression
that labor is determined by labor-time, is to employ replacement cost valuation.
According to replacement cost valuation, inputs are retroactively valued according to
their prevailing price at the end of the production cycle, rather than the price at which
they were actually purchased. In Table 5 I employ simultaneous, or replacement cost,
valuation to arrive at results identical to Table 3. To derive the per-unit cost of corn, I
divide the net value added by living labor, which is 340 for each year, by the net product.
The net product equals the corn output minus the corn input and corn wages. Once I have
this per-unit price, I retroactively determine the input prices.
Unlike Table 3, Table 5 presumes correctly that input unit prices decline with
rising productivity. Corn falls from $2 in year 1 to $1 in year 3. The profit rate rises,
however, because part of the original capital advanced is retroactively devalued. At the
end of year 1, there are 510 units of corn each worth $2. All of this is reinvested, or
ploughed back into the soil at the beginning of year 2. The capitalist therefore must
spend 510*$2, or $1020 to do this. But because of retroactive valuation, each unit of
corn appears to be worth only $1.33, so that the capitalist spends only 510*$1.33, or
$678. The problem with this, however, is that the capitalist already spent the $1020. The
fact that the corn costs less, after the $1020 is spent does not change the fact that the
capitalist spent the $1020. The fallacy of replacement cost valuation is better evinced

20

The model I use presumes a falling general rate of profit. Individual innovators will raise their profits, at
least temporarily, before their technology becomes widespread and the average profit rate falls.
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when we assume that the capitalist advances borrowed money. A capitalist who borrows
$1 million does not cease to owe the bank simply because the value of what she
purchased with that money is no longer worth anything. More importantly, Marx does
not assume that input prices equal output prices. Detractors of Marx therefore do not
derive their conclusions from Marx’s premises, but from their own. The charge of
internal inconsistency is therefore refuted.
The LTFRP is difficult if not impossible to prove because alternative accounts of
the same phenomena exist. The theory, in other words, is irreducible to the data. This
explains, in part, the emphasis placed on logical, deductive argument by participants in
this debate. John Roemer, for instance, argues that no amount of evidence can save
Marx’s LTFRP since such evidence “cannot provide refutation of a theory” (1979: 380).
Kliman shares this view, stating that, “no facts or data analysis can vindicate the LTFRP”
(2007: 115). 21
Kliman, however, does argue that Marx’s falling rate of profit hypothesis is not
only possible, but in fact plausible. He agues that the Okishio Theorem does not take into
account the “disinflationary or deflationary impacts of rising productivity” (2007: 115).
To bolster Marx’s argument that rising productivity can depress the general rate of profit,
Kliman quotes Alan Greenspan, who states that, “Indeed, the increased availability of
labor-displacing equipment and software, at declining prices and improving delivery
times, is arguably at the root of the loss of business pricing power in recent years”

21

Kliman advises that “researchers who wish to test his theory empirically should . . . focus their attention,
not on the observed trend of the profit rate, but on ascertaining whether, and to what degree, the recurrent
crises of capitalism are traceable to recurrent declines in capital values, and a tendency for prices to fall, as
a result of increasing productivity” (2007: 31).
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(quoted in Kliman 2007: 127).

Kliman’s interprets Marx’s LTFRP as a theory of

cyclically falling prices and devaluation.
In the examples above inflation is assumed to be constant. In the real world,
however, prices are systematically rising. Might this offset the LTFRP? Kliman answers
no, because inflation affects input and output prices equally. Changes in the rate of
inflation, however, can affect the profit rate. Kliman demonstrates that a rising rate of
inflation causes “causes sales revenue to increase by a greater percentage than costs
increase” raising the nominal rate of profit, whereas a falling rate of inflation increases
sales revenue “by a smaller percentage than costs, causing the nominal rate of profit to
fall” (2007: 129). What matters, then, is whether the rate of inflation falls or rises, not
whether prices are rising or falling. Disinflation, or a falling rate of inflation then, is
sufficient for the profit rate to fall. Furthermore, the rate of inflation can be decomposed
into the growth rate of the MELT (monetary expression of labor time) plus the growth
rate of values. If the MELT therefore rises by 6% and values fall by 1%, the rate of
inflation is 5%. Kliman writes that, “if faster productivity growth now causes values to
decline by 4% per year, the rate of inflation falls to about 2% . . . both the nominal and
the real rates of profit will fall” (2007: 130). It is also, however, possible that an
accelerating MELT growth rate may cancel out the affects of a growing inflation rate,
thereby canceling out the tendency for the profit rate to fall. In my regression models
below, I test for this very possibility.
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Two additional causes of crisis: Class Struggle and Realization Failure
Marx is not primarily interested in the LTFRP as a theory of cyclical fluctuations
in profitability. He is not even primarily interested in discovering economic laws, but
rather, in discovering how they appear as laws in the first place. An important and
traumatic phenomenon of the liberal, market-centered phase of capitalism in which he
lived was that of recurrent economic crises. 22

Marx maintained that these crises

displayed regular and identifiable patterns and could therefore be understood in terms of
his law of value. The meaning and significance to which he endowed the LTFRP, then,
derives from his law of value, and his attempt to explain crises, and his hope that they
would bring about capitalism’s demise.
Marx, however, does not predicate his discussions of crises exclusively on the
LTFRP. Sweezy argues that it is impossible to know how much emphasis Marx ever
placed on the LTFRP as an element of his explanation of crises (1970: 148). Indeed,
Marx discusses at least two other potential interruptions to capitalist accumulation: class
struggle and realization failure, or underconsumption. In the following passage, Marx
advocates the former theory while seemingly repudiating the latter:
It is a pure tautology to say that crises are caused by the scarcity of solvent consumers, or of a
paying consumption. The capitalist system does not know any other modes of consumption but a
paying one . . . . If any commodities are unsaleable, it means that no solvent purchasers have been
found for them, in other words, consumers . . . . But if one were to attempt to clothe this tautology
with a profounder justification by saying that the working class receive too small a portion of their
own product, and the evil would be remedied by giving them a larger share of it, or raising their
wages, we should reply that crises are precisely always preceded by a period in which wages rise
generally and the working class actually get a larger share of the annual product intended for
consumption. From the point of view of the advocates of ‘simple’ (!) common sense, such a
period should rather remove a crisis. It seems, then, that the capitalist production comprises
certain conditions which are independent of good or bad will and permit the working class to
22

I do not mean to deny the importance of contemporary crises.
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enjoy that relative prosperity only momentarily, and at that always as a harbinger of a coming
crisis. (1933: 475-6, quoted in Sweezy 1970: 151).

He does not explain here precisely the mechanism by which a rising labor’s share of
income will result in a falling profit rate, but the negative correlation is implied in his
definition of surplus-value and variable capital. Marx portrays workers as caught in a
kind of quicksand or boa constrictor’s grip, whereby any attempt to advance their
position invariably brings them closer to peril.
This passage is also frequently invoked to dismiss interpretations of Marx as an
underconsumptionist, and to deny, on the basis of Marx’s word, the possibility of
underconsumption itself. Sweezy, however, is adamant that, “there could be nothing
more absurd . . . [than to claim that] Marx regarded the magnitude of consumption as of
no consequence in the causation of crises” (1970: 151). Sweezy thinks instead that Marx
simply failed to fully develop the theory. He cites as evidence this passage in Capital III:
The last cause of all real crises always remains the poverty and restricted consumption of the
masses as compared to the tendency of capitalist production to develop the productive forces in
such a way that only the absolute power of consumption of the entire society would be their limit.
(Marx 1933: 568, quoted in Sweezy 1970: 177).

Marxian economists Conrad Schmidt, Karl Kautsky, Louis B. Boudin, Rudolf Hilderding,
and Rosa Luxembourg all emphasized realization failure in their crisis theories. Sweezy
(1942) and Baran (1957) also elaborated an RF theory of crisis, Sweezy in terms of
under-consumption, and Baran in terms of under-investment.
Sweezy describes a crisis of over-production/underconsumption as one that
results from a decline in the ratio of the rate of growth of consumption to the rate of
growth of the means of production (1970: 183). According to Sweezy, the production of
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consumer goods may lag behind the production of the means of production (factories,
fixed capital, etc.) thereby generating a crisis of over-production/under-consumption.
Another way of thinking about this is that over-production occurs when profits (which
are primarily reinvested into the means of production) grow at a faster rate than do wages.
Realization failure theories, however, have been widely criticized for mistaking
cause and effect. Raya Dunayeskaya (1989), for example, argues that the inability to sell
is a consequence and not a cause of falling profitability. Kliman (2003: 122) likewise
argues that the growth of output that is productively invested is not “constrained by
human consumption.”

Critics of the RF theory often count themselves as ardent

defenders of Marx’s LTFRP. The two theories, however, are not mutually exclusive.
One of the earliest critics of under-consumption was Tugan-Baranowsky
(Sweezy 1970:

158). Tugan argued that a crisis of over-production was not only

improbable, but impossible.

He insisted that capitalist crises resulted from

disproportionate production among the various branches of industry. His argument,
however, was not so much a proof of the impossibility of overproduction, as it was a
proof of the logical possibility that overproduction might not lead to a crisis. Using
simultaneous equations, he demonstrated that a single worker could replace the entire
working class, and so long as proportionality existed among all branches of production,
capitalism would continue to operate smoothly and would not enter into any crisis or
stagnation. Tugan-Baranowsky’s argument was universally rejected. No one denied that
a crisis of disporportionality was possible, they simply rejected Tugan’s claim that an RF
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crisis was impossible. 23

Critics insisted that, ultimately, production was for human

consumption. Yet, this seems to contradict Marx’s formula for the self-expansion of
capital, M-C-M’, and his explicit statements that production in capitalism is for
production’s sake, and not for human consumption.
How can this be reconciled? Sweezy gives an interesting answer. He notes that
the inversion of the circuit of capital in capitalism, commodity-money-commodity (C-MC), or production for use rather than profit, does not become irrelevant, since the vast
majority of the population has to sell its labor-power for money in order to purchase
consumer goods. The circuit of capital, M-C-M’, does not describe the logic of wagelabor. He therefore argues that the production of use-value for the sake of consumption,
and the production of value for the sake of production, constitute the real “fundamental
contradiction of capitalist society from which all other contradictions are ultimately
derived” (1970: 172).

23

Sweezy, for instance, considers an underconsumption crisis to be a special case of a disproportionality,
arising from the disproportionate development of the means of production relative to consumer demand
(1970: 183).
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IV. Contemporary Debates on Falling Profitability and Crisis
Theory
Among contemporary scholars, much attention has been given to what Brenner
(2006) calls “the long downturn.” This refers to the dramatic decline in both growth rates
and profit rates in all industrialized nations beginning around the 1960s.

Many

contemporary critical Left economists (e.g. Brenner 2006; Dumenil and Levy 2004) have
interpreted the ascendancy of neo-liberalism and the demise of the capital-labor accord as
class projects in response to the long downturn. One result, or perhaps symptom, of the
collapse of the capital-labor accord has been a dramatic decline in the collective capacity
of labor to act in a unified manner in its own economic interests. Union membership,
especially in the private sector, has declined dramatically in the past two decades, and the
strike, at least in the United States, has become entirely ineffective (Rosenfeld 2006). In
addition, Brenner reports that, excluding the United States, the average rate of
unemployment remains as high as the average unemployment rate during the Great
Depression. Meanwhile, the US recovery has occurred against a backdrop of stagnating
growth and a repression of wages “without precedent during the last century” (Brenner
2006: 2). Yet, despite neo-liberal policies aimed at containing wage growth, a full
recovery from the long downturn has not occurred
One of the most popular explanations for the downturn is what Brenner calls the
“contradictions of Keynesianism” thesis (2006:

16), according to which, the very

policies that restored effective demand and established the conditions for the postwar
boom by empowering labor vis-à-vis capital were ultimately self-undermining, leading to
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reduced profitability and stagnation. The premise of this argument is that declining
productivity growth by itself cannot cause a fall in profitability unless wage growth fails
to decline in tandem. This thesis explains falling profitability as a result of declining
growth, rather than vice-versa. The cause of the initial decline in growth, however, is
contested.
Brenner argues that labor strength is insufficient to explain the origins and
duration of the crisis. He points out that victories by labor are localized, whereas
pressures on profitability have been system-wide, affecting all OECD nations. Local
labor victories cannot therefore account for the “spatially generalized” and “temporallyextended” decline in profitability (Brenner 2006: 24).
Brenner proposes that the re-industrialization of Japan and Western Europe after
World War II intensified international competition and resulted in a systemic reduction in
profitability. He thus emphasizes the “horizontal” effects of unplanned competition
rather than the “vertical” struggle between capital and labor (2006: 25). Competition
acts to reduce profitability because more efficient producers put downward pressure on
prices. This in turn reduces the profit rate of those firms operating with less efficient
machinery or production techniques, while increasing the profit rate of the more efficient
firms.

In the perfectly competitive world modeled by equilibrium theory, the less

efficient producers simply disappear. In the real world, however, this does not occur.
Less efficient producers remain in business so long as they are able to retain an average
rate of profit on their circulating capital, that is, so long as they retain an average profit
margin. This is because “their fixed capital is ‘sunk’, that is, already paid for . . . . They
can thus regard it as, in practical terms, costless and its further use as free” (2006: 29).
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They must, however, reduce prices, and because of this, their rate of profit declines. This
reduces overall profitability in the market with respect to the profit rate that prevailed
prior to the introduction of the more efficient competitor. Importantly, Brenner claims
that, because production is anarchic and unplanned, this process is not self-adjusting and
not transitional.
This thesis has received much criticism. Dumenil and Levy (2002a) argue that
declining profitability has nothing to do with competition. Moreover, Brenner argues that
the long downturn originated in the manufacturing sector. Dumenil and Levy note that
the decline in profit rates actually occurred simultaneously in all sectors of the economy,
with the exception of those that they call “highly capital intensive.” Analyzing the NIPA
data for the Business sector, both corporate and non-corporate, they find that the fall in
profitability has resulted from both a decline in both the output-capital ratio and the profit
share. They argue that the decline in the output-capital ratio resulted from a decline in
real productivity, as well as from a relative increase in the prices of fixed capital to output.
Dumenil and Levy use descriptive statistics. Because Brenner also argues that his
explanation will manifest itself in declining capital-output ratios and profit shares (2006:
32), the data do not adjudicate the dispute. Brenner could easily permute his explanation
to incorporate non-manufacturing sectors. Elsewhere, Dumenil and Levy (1993) explain
long term growth cycles in terms of technical progress and the downturn in terms of a
slowdown of technical progress, a hypothesis which assumes that profit rates are
determined by physical rather than value magnitudes.
Freeman (2005) has criticized Brenner’s unquestioned acceptance of the Okishio
Theorem, emphasizing the role that a rising organic composition of capital has played in
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declining profit rates. He argues further that because Brenner’s analysis is incompatible
with simultaneous valuation and equilibrium methods, it is susceptible to dismissal by
mainstream economics, so long as he does not explicitly repudiate the use of
simultaneous equations in modeling actual economic behavior. He argues that falling
profitability has been dominated by a falling output-capital ratio caused by the
accelerating obsolescence of existing capital stocks. He interprets this in terms of Marx’s
rising organic composition of capital.

In a bivariate regression model where the

independent variable is the profit share, he finds that the r-squared for the years 1929 to
1965 is only .008. He thus argues that, “99.2 percent of the variation in the profit rate is
unexplained by the profit share” (2005: 8). His data are suspect, however, because he
makes no use of regression diagnostics. It is also not clear why he does not employ a
multivariate analysis, or a second bivariate analysis where the output-capital ratio is the
independent variable. This would help to determine whether the output-capital ratio does
indeed explain the remainder of the variation in the profit rate.
Whereas Freeman and Dumenil and Levy decompose the profit rate, at least
initially, into two factors (profit share and output capital ratio), Weisskopf (1979)
decomposes the profit rate into three factors, each of which he argues is predicted as the
primary variable by three different Marxian crisis theories. He identifies these theories as
the rising strength of labor (RSL) thesis, the realization failure (RF) thesis, and the rising
organic composition of capital (ROC) thesis. Weiskopff associates RSL with a rise in
labor’s share of income, RF with a fall in the rate of capacity utilization, and ROC with a
fall in the capacity-capital ratio.
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Weiskopff argues that the RSL thesis identifies unemployment as the most
important independent variable in the determination of the real wage. A rise in the real
wage, in turn, reduces the profit share, thus reducing the profit rate. The order of
determination is as follows: unemployment falls, real wages increase, labor’s share of
income rises, and the profit rate falls.
He next identifies realization failure with a fall in the capacity-utilization rate.
Capacity utilization refers to the rate at which industries are utilizing their existing
factories. If factories are producing at maximum capacity, the capacity utilization rate
would be 100 percent. A realization failure then, entails, not the technical impossibility
of producing more goods, but the inability to utilize this technical capacity.
A fall in the capacity-capital ratio, on the other hand, refers to a decline in the
maximum possible production capacity of firms relative to their fixed assets. 24 This is
intended to indicate a rising organic composition (ROC) of capital. An increase in the
organic composition of capital may result from either a rise in the real capital-labor ratio,
where labor is expressed in hours and capital in constant dollars, or from an increase in
the relative prices of capital goods to wage goods, independent of their physical
magnitudes.
Analyzing the non-financial corporate business (NFCB) sector for the United
States between 1949 and 1979, Weisskopf finds that the decline in profitability arises
“almost entirely” from a “rise in the true share of wages, which indicates a rise in the

24

Fixed assets are used by Weisskopf to refer to the denominator of the profit rate, K. Other aspects of K
that are included by other authors include inventories, financial capital, and the assets set aside for
compensation.
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strength of labor” (1979: 370). This contravenes the analyses of Brenner, Freeman, and
Dumenil and Levy.
Hahnel and Sherman (1982), on the other hand, employ a multivariate time-series
regression strategy, and find some support for RSL, overhead labor, and RF. Like
Weisskopf, however, they are primarily interested in the cyclical behavior of profit rates,
rather than in their long-term trends.
Raffalovich, Leicht, and Wallace (1992) focus exclusively on labor’s share of
income, or the wage share, rather than the rate of profit. Their models, however, improve
upon previous research and their findings are relevant to Marxian theories of declining
profitability and crises insofar as the wage share remains an important determinant. Their
primary finding is that the data support the realization failure (RF) thesis.
Unemployment is negatively associated with the wage share (W/Y), meaning that
increasing employment results in a greater portion of income going to labor. This may
seem to favor the RSL thesis, but they find no significant relationship between
unemployment and compensation. The RSL thesis is therefore not supported. The
negative relationship between unemployment and wage share in fact occurs because
additional workers absorb more of the national income, not because these workers, on
average, get paid any more.
In addition, they test for the so-called overhead labor effect, which proposes that
capacity utilization varies inversely with compensation. As capacity utilization falls,
workers are laid off. The workers, who cannot be easily fired, however, usually earn
higher wages. As a result, “less profit is made per worker” and labor’s share of income
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rises (Hahnel and Sherman 1982: 55). 25

Raffalovich, Leicht, and Wallace (1992),

however, find no relationship between capacity utilization and average compensation.
They summarize their findings by stating:
. . . . only the “wage lag” hypothesis survives unscathed. Contrary to the predictions of the “rising
strength of labor” hypothesis, increasing unemployment does not reduce labor’s share of income
by reducing the average rate of pay- it reduces labor’s share by reducing the quantity of labor
employed. Contrary to predictions of the “overhead labor” hypothesis, increasing capacity
utilization does not reduce labor’s income share by reducing the average rate of pay- it reduces
labor’s share by increasing output more rapidly than total compensation. Consistent with prior
research and the “wage lag” hypothesis, labor productivity- but not compensation- increases with
increasing rates of capacity utilization. Output therefore increases faster (and decreases more
slowly) than the total compensation of labor. (1992: 254).

Raffalovich, Leicht, and Wallace do not relate their findings to Marxian crisis theory, but
the consequences of a slower rise in the rate of labor compensation relative to “growth”,
i.e. profits, would be identical to that of Sweezy’s declining ratio of consumption growth
to capital stock growth. In terms of Marx’s theory of exploitation, it provides strong
evidence that rising wages are indeed compatible with rising exploitation since wages
grow at a slower rate than national income.

25

Neither Hahnel and Sherman (1982) nor Raffalovich et al. (1992) make an argument as to why capacity
utilization is the primary independent variable here rather than employment.
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IV. Description of Data and Methods

To determine empirical profit trends for the United States I estimate several rates
of profit using data from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) and Fixed
Asset Tables available from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). 26 The trends for
these profit rates are depicted graphically in Figure 1.
NFCB refers to the Non-Financial Corporate Business Sector. The numerator of
the profit rate, annual profit, is calculated directly from NIPA accounts, net of inventory
value adjustment (IVA) and capital consumption adjustments (CCadj). 27 The capital
stock is calculated from the fixed assets of the NFCB sector. Manufacturing profits are
likewise calculated by dividing annual manufacturing profits by total manufacturing fixed
assets.
The business profit rate is calculated by dividing the profits of the Business sector,
which includes all private entities organized for profit, by the price of non-residential
fixed capital assets. Profits are derived by deducting employee compensation from the
total output of the business sector. Because the NIPA includes in the total output of the
Business sector the output of both self-employed persons and government enterprises, it
is necessary to calculate the compensation of each in the compensation estimate. Fixed
assets do not include inventories or, unfortunately, the fixed assets of government

26

See appendix for full details of these estimates.
In including IVA in my analysis, I follow Weisskopf’s (1979) method. A debate between Munley (1981)
and Weisskopf (1981) has taken place over the correct interpretation of the IVA.
27
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enterprises, which are not listed separately from general government assets in the fixed
assets tables.
Finally, the domestic profit rate is calculated by deducting from the entire net
domestic product (NDP) total compensation of employees, and dividing this profit
estimate by the value of total fixed assets. The domestic profit rate least resembles the
others because it includes non-capitalist sectors of the economy including the income and
fixed asserts of government and residential sectors. All prices are in current dollars.28 In
Figure 1, all profit rates exhibit similar trends.

Henceforth, I will limit discussion

primarily to the NFCB and manufacturing sector due to data availability.
For my regression models I use labor’s share of income (W/Y) rather than profit
share (p/Y). This eliminates some potential problems of auto-correlation. It is also more
important to this study. In addition, I regress not levels, but changes in these variables.
Analyzing movements rather than levels eliminates most problems with auto-correlation
(Hahnel and Sherman 1982), which is particularly troublesome for time-series analysis.
It must therefore be remembered that, whereas in a typical regression model, the
dependent variable (Y) is regressed on several independent variables (X’s), the regression
models I employ instead regress changes (Yt2-Yt1) of the dependent variables on changes
in the independent variables (Xt2-Xt1). All models presented below meet Gauss-Markov
assumptions and are tested for autocorrelation using the Breusch-Godfrey test, at the
p<.05 level.

28

Current cost estimates reflect “the value . . . expressed in the prices that would have been paid for those
assets if they had been purchased at the end of [that year]” (BEA 2003).
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Decompositions of the Profit Rate
Figure 1 shows that profit rates in the United States have fallen dramatically since
the 1940s. In addition, the percentage of income distributed to employees, in the form of
compensation and benefits, has grown steadily, but fell slightly during the 1990s. The
profit share has generally moved in the opposite direction. It is useful also to look at
these trends graphically. Figures 2 and 3 depict both the profit share and wage share for
the NFCB sector. In addition, some descriptive statistics of the rate of profit and its
decompositions in the manufacturing and NFCB sectors are provided in Tables 6 and 7.
The manufacturing and NFCB sectors show similar trends. 29 One interesting
observation is that the profit rate in the manufacturing sector rises despite a fall in capital
productivity from the 1980s to the 1990s. The output capital ratio (Y/K) measures how
many dollars of output can be generated for every $1 of input, with input referring to
capital stocks. It is therefore a measure of the productivity of capital in price terms. This
is interesting because it necessarily means that the rise in the rate of profit occurred at the
expense of labor’s share of total income. Furthermore, the fall in the output capital ratio
is the result of a falling capacity capital ratio (Z/K). In Marxian terms, this signifies a
rising organic composition of capital. These data demonstrate that during the 1990s the
rising organic composition of capital was offset by the intensification of surplus value
extraction.

29

I do not include the capacity utilization and capacity capital ratios for the NFCB sector because capacity
utilization data (which is necessary to calculate the variable Z) is only available for the manufacturing
sector.
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I next supplement these descriptive statistics by utilizing a multivariate timeseries regression analysis of the rate of profit for the United States in the manufacturing
sector. Importantly, I test for the effects of the rate of inflation and the growth rate of the
MELT on profit rate trends. To my knowledge, this study is the first multivariate timeseries regression analysis to employ these important variables.
To calculate the rate of inflation, I use the average annual rate of change available
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 30 To calculate the MELT, I use a simple algorithm
developed by Kliman (2007). Because the TSSI distinguishes between the price of inputs
and outputs, each year has two MELTs, which are calculated by equation 1.

1) Mt+1=$Pt+1/[($Ct/Mt)+Lt,t+1]

M refers to the MELT; $P refers to the price of gross output; $C refers to the price of
intermediate inputs; and L refers to labor hours added in the interim. The subscript

t+1

refers to outputs and the subscript t refers to inputs. This distinction is relative, however,
because the outputs of one period are the inputs of a subsequent period, and so on. Gross
output and intermediate input estimates for the manufacturing sector are provided by the
BEA. 31
A problem arises, however, because the initial MELT is not given. There are a
number of ways to handle this. It can be calculated with data on changes in the price

30

Available at ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt.
Available at http://bea.gov/bea/uguide.htm#_1_15. Estimates from 1947-997 are defined according to
the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system, whereas data after 1997 are defined according to the
1997 North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS). Some discrepancies are therefore,
unfortunately, unavoidable.

31
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level and changes in productivity, where productivity refers to the ratio of physical
outputs to total labor hours (both living and past).

The best estimate of physical

productivity is therefore the multifactor productivity estimates available from the BLS,
but because these data are not available prior to 1987, I do not use this estimate. 32
Fortunately, it is not necessary to be exact in the calculation of the initial MELT because
equation 1 necessitates that the discrepancy between the real Mt and the estimated Mt
rapidly vanishes after a few cycles. In fact, to test this, I plugged in as my initial estimate
of the MELT $1 and then $1,000,000 for 1977. Both estimates yielded a MELT of
$48.78/hour by 2005. It is still better, however, to estimate an initial input MELT rather
than plugging in a random number. I therefore assume that the initial input MELT is
equal to the initial output MELT. Assume that Mt= Mt+1. Dividing the left hand side of
equation 1 by the denominator of the right hand side, [($Ct/Mt)+Lt,t+1], multiplying and
rearranging terms, yields equation 2:

2) Mt= Mt+1=($Pt+1-$Ct)/L

This is a simultaneist version of the MELT. I use it initially, but then do not assume that
subsequent input and output MELTs remain equal. Finally, to get the growth rate of the
MELT, I calculate the percent change from the input MELT to the output MELT,
according to equation 3:

32

By definition M=pQ/L where p is a price level, Q is a quantity of physical output, and L is labor hours
(both past and living labor). Q/L is an index of productivity. Substituting R for Q/L yields, M=pR. Mt+1/
Mt=[ pt+1/pt]x[Rt+1/Rt]. pt+1/pt=(1+%change in price level), and Rt+1/Rt=(1+%change in productivity). Mt+1
therefore equals =[ pt+1/pt]x[Rt+1/Rt]x Mt. Substituting this for the left side of equation 1, eventually yields
the formula M=[($P/pR)-$C]/L.
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3) Percent Change=(Mt+1- Mt)/Mt

I regress changes in the manufacturing profit rate on the wage share, capacity
utilization and capacity capital ratios. This is consistent with Weisskopff’s methodology.
I also include the lagged dependent variable as a control. The model therefore does not
assume that profit rate changes are independent of its prior history, and can therefore be
interpreted as a model of system inertia (Raffalovich 1992). In addition, I utilize robust
regression techniques to avoid problems of heteroskedasticity. My results are depicted in
Table 8.
In model 1, data for all variables are provided from 1950 to 2005. Data used to
calculate the MELT, however, are not available prior to 1977, and because I am using
annual changes in the growth rate of the MELT, the initial year for all other models is
1978. The results for models 1 and 2 are not surprising. Changes in the wage share are
negatively correlated with changes in the profit rate. As more of the total national
income is distributed as compensation, profit rates fall. This variable therefore captures
the distributional struggle between capital and labor. Capacity utilization is positively
associated with profits, which makes sense because factories and equipment are more
fully utilized during economic upturns. Finally, the capacity capital ratio, the inverse of
Marx’s organic composition of capital, is positively correlated with changes in the profit
rate. As capital productivity rises, so does the profit rate. These relationships remain
approximately the same in models 3 and 4.
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In model 3 and 4, however, the rate of inflation is correlated with the profit rate in
the opposite direction as Kliman predicts. According to Kliman, a rising rate of inflation
should be correlated with a rising nominal rate of profit, and a rising MELT growth rate
should be correlated with a rising rate of profit. 33 Models 3 and 4 support the latter but
fail to confirm the former. Kliman’s analysis assumes that if prices rise continuously,
then outputs are more expensive than inputs. The input-output model, however, assumes
discrete, not continuous change, and production is not so neatly demarcated into beforeand-after snapshots. Even if it were, it would not be likely that different industries would
coordinate their production cycles so that they all purchased and sold inputs at the same
time. Furthermore, the data on MELT and inflation growth rates are annual averages.
Although it might be possible to suggest that inputs would be less expensive than outputs
for one production cycle, thus raising the profit rate, one cannot conclude that the average
of the inputs to all production cycles are less expensive than the average of the outputs to
all production cycles. My analysis so far only suggests, however, that the rate of inflation
and the growth rate of the MELT should have no affect on the profit rate. Instead, they
are highly significant.
There is another reason, though, why the rate of inflation should be positively, not
negatively correlated with the rate of profit. The rate of inflation is taken from the
consumer price index. It does not therefore measure directly the rate of inflation of
inputs to the production process, i.e. intermediate goods and raw materials, nor does it
measure price changes in capital stocks, the denominator of the profit rate. It therefore

33

In results not shown here, I test for interaction effects between inflation rate and MELT growth rate.
Results are not significant.
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seems that it should affect only the prices of outputs that are sold as consumer goods on
the market. Rising consumer good prices, therefore, should indicate a rising rate of profit,
all other things being equal.
The data, however, are clearly suggestive that increases in the rate of inflation
entail an increase in the expenditures of manufacturing businesses, and that this is not
offset by the increased prices of the goods they attempt to sell. The wage share (W/Y)
variable holds constant the distribution of income between profits and compensation, but
does not hold constant the proportion of compensation that consumers actually spend. It
is plausible that as the price of consumer goods rises, demand diminishes relative to the
supply. This is consistent with the TSSI model, since variable capital is itself an input to
production, not an output. Because wages tend to rise at a slower rate that income, wagelabor would not be able to purchase output sold. This means in Marxian terms that the
value of labor-power diminishes relative to the value of the commodities it produces.
The fact that the wage share controls for the distribution of income does not negate this,
since income does not include capital stocks or wealth, which, although not measured
directly by the consumer price index, should rise concurrently with it, or perhaps rise at
an even faster rate. In addition, capital stocks do not include the actual output, which
would not be counted as capital stocks. In other words, as the rate of inflation increases,
purchasing power diminishes, and the value of what capitalists receive in income relative
to the value of the commodities they produce and already possess diminishes as well.
The nominal profit rate thus falls.
The MELT, on the other hand, appears to behave in the way that Kliman predicts.
Furthermore, the rate of inflation and the MELT are controls for each other. Because the
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rate of inflation is mathematically identical to the MELT growth rate plus the growth rate
of value, the MELT indicates the effect of the rate of income change in value terms.
A=B+C, where A is the rate of inflation and B is the growth rate of the MELT and C is
the growth rate of value. This relation entails that when A is held constant and B rises, C
must fall, and when B is held constant and A rises, C must rise. Thus, a rise in the
growth rate of the MELT, when controlling for the rate of inflation, means that the
growth rate of value has diminished. Model 4 indicates that a falling value growth rate is
correlated with a rise in the nominal rate of profit. In addition, a rise in the rate of
inflation, when controlling for the growth rate of the MELT, implies a growing rate of
value. Model 4 indicates that an accelerating growth rate of value is correlated with a fall
in the nominal rate of profit. All of this is consistent with Marx’s LTFRP. The findings
in Table 8 are also, however, entirely consistent with a realization failure process. The
faster value accumulates relative to its prior history, the more the nominal profit rate
declines. Marx’s LTFRP explains this as the diminishing contribution of living labor to
production, whereas the RF thesis explains it in terms of an imbalance between the
accumulation of capital and the compensation to employees. Both are supported here.
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Determinations of Labor’s Share of Income

Next, I test the rising strength of labor (RSL) thesis, and then attempt to determine
the most important predictors of changes in labor’s share of income. The RSL theory
predicts that the wage share and profit rate are negatively correlated. This has already
been demonstrated above. Specifically, it predicts that wages will vary inversely with
unemployment.

As unemployment falls, labor becomes stronger and workers can

successfully negotiate for higher wages. This relationship is tested in Table 9, for the
manufacturing sector. The per capita wage is measured in current dollars and is equal to
total compensation in the manufacturing sector divided by total employment.
Compensation includes wages, salaries, and benefits. Employee data are taken from the
manufacturing sector.

Because the dependent variable, per cpaita compensation, is

curvilinear, I use the differences of its natural log. I also control for inflation since I am
using compensation figures in nominal, rather than real, dollars. Note, however, that I
am not controlling for the rate of inflation, but rather, keeping the absolute level of
inflation constant.
Little relation is detected between unemployment and per capita compensation.
There is no correlation for model 1. In addition, there is auto-correlation for model 1 at
the p<.01 level. This does not pose a problem, however, because auto-correlation can
only inflate estimation results. In model 2, there is only a marginal correlation, and it is
in the opposite direction as predicted by the RSL thesis.

Rising unemployment is

associated with a rise in compensation, not a fall. Thus, the evidence here does not
support the idea that labor in the United States, during the latter half of the 20th century,
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has been more successful at collectively bargaining for higher wages during periods of
high employment.
In Table 10, I regress changes in labor’s share of income on changes in
unemployment, per capita compensation, growth, and capacity utilization. All data are
for the manufacturing sector. As before, I use the natural log of compensation and
growth.

Growth is calculated as the annual differences in total income for the

manufacturing sector, where total income is the sum of profits and compensation. I keep
the absolute level of inflation constant, and also introduce the MELT as a variable. I do
not regress changes in the wage share on the growth rate of the MELT, but rather, on its
changes. I do not include the growth rate of the MELT because there is no theoretical
reason to do so. 34

In order to compare the independent variables, I include the beta

coefficients.
As expected rising unemployment is correlated with a fall in the wage share;
rising per capita wages are correlated with a rise in the wage share, and growth correlates
with a fall in labor’s share of income. All of these results are consistent with the wage
lag, or realization failure thesis and support the findings of Raffalovich, Leicht, and
Wallace (1992). Because income grows faster than compensation, growth is correlated
with a fall in the wage share. This is true when holding the average rate of compensation
constant. Likewise, inflation is correlated with a fall in the wage share. In model 3,
capacity utilization becomes a significant predictor of changes in the wage share, but
34

In results not shown here, I include the growth rate of the MELT and the rate of inflation as controls,
instead of inflation and changes in the MELT. Together, rates of growth of inflation and the MELT are not
significant. This indicates that an accelerating rate of value accumulation does not directly affect the
distributional struggle over nominal income. This further supports Marx’s LTFRP because the effects of a
rising organic composition should be seen in the ratio of L/(C+V), or in the output capital ratio, rather than
in how L is distributed between profit and variable capital.
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because average per capita pay is held constant, it cannot be due to an overhead labor
effect.
The most interesting result is that when controlling for the MELT in model 4,
unemployment becomes less significant, while both capacity utilization and inflation
become non-significant compared to model 3. The MELT itself is highly significant and
negatively correlated with the wage share. Basically, as labor time is represented by
more money, a smaller proportion of that money is distributed to workers in the form of
compensation. This might seem counter-intuitive, but the MELT is the expression not
only of living labor, i.e. new value added, but of past labor also. Consequently, the
amount of (embodied past) labor that $1 can purchase diminishes, independently of what
it can purchase in physical use-value terms. This to my knowledge is a new finding, and
indicates that a rise in the MELT is not arbitrary but relates to wage share in a
determinate way. To explain my results, it is helpful to consider two simple definitions
of the MELT. Because gross output minus intermediate input is roughly equivalent to
value added, and because new value added is attributable to living labor, Equation 3 can
be reformulated as:

4) M=Y/L

Y is income, and L is living labor. The MELT is therefore a ratio of nominal (i.e. price)
added value to living labor. An increase in M therefore entails a rise in Y/L, the ratio of
value-added to living labor. But, Y is held constant by the growth variable. A rise in M
therefore entails a decline in L relative to Y, or in other words, increasing nominal
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productivity, and because inflation is also added as a control, this indicates the
introduction of labor-saving technologies. The MELT, however, can also be written as:

5) M=pQ/L

The small p is a price index, Q is the physical quantity of goods produced, and L is labor
hours, both living and past labor. Because inflation is held constant, a rise in M entails
necessarily a rise in the ratio of Q/L. Because L includes both the hours added by living
labor, and the past hours of labor embodied in machines, a rise in M indicates a rise in
total productivity. Equations 4 and 5 are two different ways to arrive at the same idea.
An increase in productivity lowers labor’s share of income, all other factors held constant.
Because Y/L and Q/L closely resemble the output capital ratio, Y/K, I add Y/K as
another control variable. In results not shown here this surprisingly is not significant and
has no effect on the significance of the MELT as a predictor of changes in the wage share.
How is this possible? The most likely explanation is that Y/K is not a direct measure of
inputs and outputs. K, for instance is measured as the value of fixed assets. It does not
therefore include the price spent on intermediate inputs and raw materials. In addition, Y
is a measure of income, or money received. It is not therefore identical to the difference
between outputs and inputs. For instance, companies may have vast inventories of
unsold commodities, and it would not affect the wage share, W/Y, or the output capital
ratio, Y/K, because it would neither be counted as income, Y, or be included in the
capital stocks, K.
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The most plausible explanation for Table 10 is again the realization failure (RF)
theory. The model presented in Table 10, however, clearly introduces new dimensions of
complexity that the abstract models of accumulation do not entirely take into account. A
rising MELT is associated with a falling nominal wage share (W/Y), even when growth
Y, is held constant, per capita compensation is held constant, and unemployment is held
constant.

Controlling for growth is similar to assuming simple reproduction.

The

missing element seems to be the absolute amount of living labor added to the production
process, and how much this labor is exploited. It is plausible that the MELT variable
captures some intensification of surplus-value extraction that is neither captured by per
capita compensation averages (in current dollars), nor by total growth of Y. Since the
growth variable controls more or less for Y, the change must arise in W. In addition, it
important to remember that, strictly speaking, $P-$C, or the difference in price between
intermediate inputs and gross outputs, is not equal to $Y, which is only the difference
between P and C realized on the market. Because Y is held constant, a rise in the MELT
indicates that (P-C)/L rises which corresponds with a fall in total compensation W.
Because inflation controls for the price of consumer goods, we can assume that P remains
constant as well. A rise in M must therefore result from a fall in $C, the price of
intermediate inputs, which correlates with a fall in total compensation to labor. This is
consistent with my analysis above: productivity growth leads to diminishing input costs,
which has the seemingly paradoxical effect of depressing profit rates. Marx’s LTFRP is
one way of resolving this paradox.
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Empirical Test of the Realization Failure Hypothesis
To test Sweezy’s hypothesis of a falling ratio of consumption growth to the
growth of means of production, I present the ratios of the growth rate of wages to the
growth rate of fixed assets 35 . Because they are curvilinear, I take the natural log of both.
Data are taken from the Non-Financial Corporate Business Sector (NFCB). My results
are presented in Table 11, along with a comparison of ten-year average Wage Shares
(W/Y), Profit Shares (P/Y), and Profit Rates (P/K) for the NFCB sector.
Table 11 shows that the rate of growth of compensation relative to fixed capital
assets declined dramatically during World War II and reached its subsequent lowest point
during the 70s. It moves in tandem with the wage share, but noticeably diverges with the
trend in the wage share in the 1970s and the 1990s. In the 1970s, the rate of growth of
consumer goods relative to capital goods falls dramatically compared to the previous
decade, whereas the wage share actually increases and the profit share falls. The rate of
profit falls when compared to the 1960s, and at the same time, growth in capital stocks
outpaces that of consumer goods.
The fall in the growth rate of compensation probably arises from a general
slowdown in national economic growth. This explains the fact that wages constitute a
greater portion of total (circulating) income during the 1970s. This provides evidence for
an explanation of the long downturn in terms of a realization failure or wage lag. As
Sweezy predicts, a decline in the ratio of the compensation growth to capital growth

35

This is calculated in STATA by running a robust regression where the independent variable is the natural
log of employee compensation,. I then find the derivatives by running the “mfx” [marginal effects]
estimator.
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occurs alongside a fall in profit rates. At the same time, however, labor’s share of
income increases. This indicates that the fall in profit rates and profit shares was the
result of declining growth rates. It is not the numerator of the wage share (W/Y) that
grows faster; rather it is probably the denominator that grows slower.
It is outside the scope of this study to identify the possible causes of the initial
slow down which precipitated the seemingly contradictory slowdown in compensation
growth relative to fixed capital growth and a concurrent rise in labor’s share of income.
It is impossible to determine with the data provided whether these disturbances were the
result of exogenous shocks (such as oil prices) or endogenous ones. The reality is
probably that both played a part, although the question of which trends are endogenous or
exogenous is somewhat arbitrary since it depends on the model being used. I would only
like to point out here some preliminary evidence in favor of the realization failure, or
wage lag, hypothesis. One scenario consistent with the data is that a crisis of underconsumption, indicated by the falling growth rate of compensation, precipitated a fall in
investment, and hence, of growth generally. Because growth rates fell, while at the same
time wages remained relatively stable (in absolute terms), the wage share tended to rise.
Again, this is only one plausible explanation rooted in the theories just explicated.
Further research would need to be conducted to substantiate these claims, which would
not be limited by, among other factors, focus on a single nation-state.
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Testing Brenner’s hypothesis
I now test the causal mechanism put forth by Brenner. His argument is essentially
an argument for accelerating obsolescence 36 brought about intensified international
competition.

Although he argues explicitly that his hypothesis regarding the long

downturn will manifest itself in a declining profit share and increasing capital-output
ratio, these findings are consistent with nearly every explanation. I therefore set out to
test here the specific causal mechanism of international competition.
I model this by using changes in the trade to GDP ratio in current dollars. I use
current dollars here rather than constant dollars because the latter tend to “exaggerate the
openness ratio” (Hirst and Thompson 1999: 62). Trade-to-GDP ratios are not exact since
they include the import contents of exports, and vice versa. They also do not include
financial investments, direct or indirect. However, because Brenner hypothesizes that
trade in manufacturing led to declining profitability, a measure of trade in actual goods
and services is sufficient. I take the average of imports and exports and divide them by
GDP to get this ratio. I analyze annual percent changes.
The trade-to-GDP ratio should, according to Brenner’s hypothesis, affect the price
ratio of output to capital, since more dollars of capital inputs are required to produce a
dollar of output. The trade to GDP ratio should therefore have a positive relation to the
capacity output ratio. In turn, the capacity output ratio should vary negatively with the

36

It may appear that de-valuing the denominator of the capital stock, K, would lead to a rise in the profit
rate. As Freeman (2005) points out, however, all losses in the value of the K must be deducted from the
numerator of the profit rate. For example, an investor who borrows $1 million to purchase a factory cannot
pay her lender back only half that amount, even if, the day after she purchases it, the factory is now only
worth half that much. In this case, the investor has in effect lost $500,000.
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profit rate. 37 I have also analyzed exports and imports individually as ratios to the GDP,
and the natural log of their differences. I also use the natural log of trade itself, rather
than a ratio, in both current and constant dollars. I test a total of six independent
variables: trade to GDP ratio; exports to GPD ratio; imports to GDP ratio; the natural log
of annual changes in exports; the natural log of annual changes in imports; and the
natural log of annual changes in trade. I regress three different dependent variables:
annual changes in the profit rate; annual changes in the output capital ratio (Y/K); and the
annual changes in the capacity output ratio (Z/K).
Although trade is a good proxy for international openness, it does not capture the
efficiency of the competitors themselves. If Brenner’s hypothesis is correct, however, a
significant correlation should be detected between the profit rate, and more specifically,
the capacity capital ratio (Z/K), and trade. I am therefore testing a spurious relationship
that would appear if his hypothesis is correct. I include in Figure 4, a graph of the trade
to GDP ratio over time, compared to the profit rate for the NFCB sector.

When

controlling for economic growth, I find no significant relationship between the three
dependent variables (capacity capital ratio, the output capital ratio, and the profit rate)
and any of the six independent variables.

37

Brenner (2006: 34-7) refers to “over-capacity,” which occurs when capacity utilization exceeds a certain
level. There is debate among economists about where this level lies, and how it has changed over time.
Testing for this specific effect is outside the scope of this paper.
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V. Discussion and Conclusions
I shall begin my concluding remarks by acknowledging the limitations of this
study. My study only provides a brief snapshot of economic reality for the United States,
and only for a few decades after the Second World War. Its results cannot therefore be
generalized in time or in space. This relatively brief snapshot is, moreover, a highly
filtered and narrow one.

Its scope is specific and precise, yet because of this, it

ramifications are also. My models, along with Marx’s, assume away unequal exchange,
coercion, and production outside of the market. Furthermore, my calculations of the
MELT are for the manufacturing sector only, yet Marx’s equality of total price and total
value only pertains to an aggregate, closed economy, which, if it were to exist, would be
global. In addition, the data on labor hours do not, and cannot, indicate whether these
hours are all “socially necessary.” My results are therefore at best tentative and in some
placed somewhat speculative. Furthermore, the independent variables of my regression
analyses are not ontological entities interacting causally with the world. They are in fact
only synthetic abstractions. They are at best indirect indicators of more fundamental
social processes that depend, ultimately on the decisions made by real individual and
collective actors.
The TSSI has demonstrated the consistency of Marx’s conclusion that rising
productivity can result in a falling rate of profit. My findings are also entirely consistent
with this hypothesis. First, I find that accelerating value accumulation corresponds with a
falling nominal rate of profit. This not only confirms Marx’s law of the tendential fall in
the rate of profit, it also supports the ontological validity of value as a self-moving
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substance that has some bearing upon its phenomenal form of appearance, price. Second,
I find that productivity growth itself, as a ratio of output to embodied labor time, exhibits
strong correlations that are not captured by conventional profit rate variables.
Furthermore, my findings indicate that productivity growth leads to diminishing costs,
which correlates with a falling rate of profit.

This is entirely inconsistent with

simultaneous valuation, and indicates that a non-equilibrium, temporal approach to inputoutput modeling is warranted. Finally, I provide evidence for a variable imbalance
between the growth rates of compensation and capital stock accumulation.

This

imbalance strongly supports the RF thesis. I argue, moreover, that the LTFRP and the RF
theses are not incompatible, but are instead two descriptions of a single multidimensional process.
I am left wondering, however, what is the central question that these hypotheses
address? Are these theories still relevant today, and if so, in what capacity? The
arguments employed to defend or refute Marx’s LTFRP are predicated on models of
reality that have scarcely changed in over a 100 years. Has capitalism, in its post-liberal
and now neo-liberal phases, evolved in any way that might enable it to develop new
counteracting tendencies, and new strategies for managing its own internal contradictions?
The input-output models cannot answer these questions, for they are not capable of
deductively establishing the logical validity of their own premises 38 , nor can they can
determine their actual historical preconditions. The models of capital accumulation that I
present in Tables 1-5 therefore seemingly apply to any society, even those in which labor
is remunerated with corn, not money. In other words, the models pay no attention to the
38

This was established famously by Kurt Gödel’s incompleteness theorems.
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material, historical, organizational, and social media in which the law is ostensibly
articulated.
In addition, it isn’t clear from these models what the relationship is between the
economic and non-economic spheres of society, or what philosophy of history, if any, is
implied. Nor is there even a clear logical connection between these models and a theory
of class struggle, with which they are most commonly identified. Indeed, I would argue
that the primary relation that the law of value presupposes is one of interdependence, not
antagonism. Profits are the mechanism by which social surplus is reinvested in capitalist
societies. It is because of this, and not only because of capitalist class retaliation, that
falling profit rates also harm workers. This seems to give the paradoxical result that
workers are “damned if they do, and damned if they don’t.” Workers will suffer if wages
are low, and they will suffer even more if profits are low. Consequently, the so-called
“contradictions of Keynesianism” thesis is a misnomer, because the contradictions belong
entirely to capitalism itself.

Certainly these contradictions are not resolved by

eliminating completely the remaining remnants of civil society. Labor and capital stand
to each other in a relationship of reciprocal presupposition, and because of this, labor is
confronted with a Sisyphean task, that can only be transcended along with the immanent
categorial barriers to its own self-abolition.
The foundation of Marx’s value theoretic approach is that value is determined by
labor time. Yet it is unclear whether this is a logical premise, as the TSS scholars seem to
understand it, or whether it is an historical precondition. Marx himself seems to waver
on the issue. On the one hand, he sometimes indicates that value is determined by labor
time because capitalist society is predicated on abstract labor. I myself interpreted it this
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way in my introduction to Marx’s value theory. Yet, this does not explain how or why a
single precondition of capitalist society also became an exclusive determination, or why
it isn’t simply a tautology to define value in terms of labor time and then to say that the
latter determines the former. On the other hand, Marx appears to suggest that the
determination of value is merely a logical premise upon which he constructs his
theoretical edifice. Marx thus regards “the necessity of proving the concept of value” as
“nonsense” (1941: 73). Yet this acknowledgment deprives his value theory of labor of
much of its emotive appeal and analytical force. TSSI scholars, for instance, rather than
developing a theory to describe the world, have thus far developed an interpretation to
defend a theory. But why is this theory more important than any other? 39
This ambiguity extends to the epistemological status of his law of value. Because
the law of value is a socially constructed law that is historically and spatially
circumscribed, it is unclear in what sense it is a law. This problem also pertains to
Marx’s law of the tendency for the profit rate to fall. Sayer (1979: 135-141) argues that
Marx employs neither induction nor deduction, but rather abduction, in which he first
observes some phenomenon, then provides a plausible hypothesis regarding the cause of
the phenomenon, and then makes other predictions that would occur if his hypothesis
were true. This argument has later been developed in neo-realist terms by Richard
Marsden who argues that, “the law of value refers to the powers of a real, but nonempirical, social substance which undergoes metamorphosis through various material

39

I do not wish to single out the TSSI for this criticism since it applies to all Marxian economics, and most
Marxian social theory as well. Of course, Marxian economics can also be defended on the grounds of
pluralism.
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forms” (1998: 308). The law is non-empirical because it cannot be derived immediately
from sensory impressions.
The labor theory of value, however, need not be understood in such deterministic
and economistic terms. In fact, I would argue that the emancipatory potential of Marx’s
value theoretic approach is unnecessarily truncated when viewed primarily as a theory of
class struggle rooted in the market. Postone (1993, 1995, 1999), for instance, has argued
persuasively that Marx’s value theory is, at its core, a theory of modern social mediation.
Class struggle is therefore epiphenomenal, and irreducible to the core social relations of
capitalism. Postone interprets the law of value as an account of how the organization of
labor-time becomes a self-mediating determinant of social life. He does not limit value
theory’s applicability to liberal market-centered phases of capitalism. The determination
of value by labor-time thus describes a temporal norm that retains the social necessity of
the expenditure of abstract labor-time for the reconstitution of capitalist society, despite
the diminishing importance of labor-time expenditure to the production of material
wealth. The law of value, meanwhile, describes the inherent barrier to the qualitative
transformation of work into free time, a transformation rendered objectively possible by
the law itself. Understood in this sense, a society in which value is not determined by
labor time is a society in which labor time ceases to be a determinant of social life, or in
other words, when value becomes determined, not by labor per se, but by autonomous
human action. Such emancipatory considerations are lacking in the falling rate of profit
literature.
My findings are not easily assimilated into a narrative form, and do not provide
any definite answers. This makes it difficult to discern the meaning and relevance of the
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debate surrounding the profit rate, which in turn makes it difficult to derive from the
research any normative orientations. I am aware that my own study is certainly subject
to the same criticisms I raise above. It is therefore important to emphasize that this study
is not intended as an authoritative declaration of an apodictic truth of the profit rate. The
problem that TSSI scholars confronted was that a riddle, in the form of made up
mathematical equations, became endowed with the force and power of a reality. On their
own terms, the equations were indisputable. For nearly a century, this bred a narrowing
of thought that did not recognize itself as such. It is against the ready-made reality of the
world that I caution. Reality must instead be un-realized. My own study certainly is
limited in the ways that I suggest the discourse as a whole is limited. By acknowledging
these limitations, I hope that they do not become impediments to new thinking or future
research.
By positing economic laws, Marxian economists participate unwittingly in a
representation of the distance between the law and its social origins. They participate in
what can only be described as a kind of quest for the certainty of an objectively ready-tohand world. The quest for objective redemption entails, also, an immanent disavowal of
the fact that, “sociology [along with economics!], unlike natural sciences, deals with a
pre-interpreted world where the creation of and reproduction of meaning frames is a very
condition of that which it seeks to analyze, namely human social conduct” (Giddens in
Habermas 1984: 110). In short, by ignoring the process of fetishism that enables
autonomous economic representations, we run the risk of reinforcing the heteronomous
reality these representations enforce. It is my hope that that this study has contributed to
an understanding of these representations, without, however, succumbing to them. .
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Appendix A: Data Sources for Profit Rate and Wage Share

75

A. Domestic Profit Rate p/K
1. Profit p equals income minus compensation (Y-W)
2. Y=NDP NIPA 1.7.5 NDP is net domestic product, which equals GDP minus the
depreciation of capital
3. W=Compensation of employees NIPA 6.2 plus a calculated compensation for the
self-employed (SE)
4. The wage for the SE equals the unit wage per employee multiplied by the number
of full-time equivalent Self Employed
5. The number of Self Employed workers taken from NIPA 6.7
6. Unit wage for SE is total domestic compensation 6.2 divided by the total number
of full-time equivalent employed 6.5 NIPA
7. K equals total fixed assets from line 2 of 1.1 FA tables. Includes private and
government assets, residential and non-residential. Does not include inventories.
B. Business Profit Rate p/K
1. Profit p equals Y-W
2. W equals Business Compensation NIPA 6.2A-D, plus compensation for
Government Enterprises (GE) NIPA 6.2A-D for state, federal and local
governments, plus a calculated amount for the compensation for the Self
Employed (SE)
3. SE equals a unite wage times the number of the self employed in the private
sector NIPA 6.7
4. Unit wage equals total compensation of employees in the business sector 6.2A-D,
divided by the total number of employees in the private sector NIPA 6.5
5. K equals non-residential fixed assets FA table 1.1. Does not include inventories
or the assets of government enterprises.
C. Manufacturing Profit Rate p/K
1. Profit p equals Manufacturing profits NIPA 6.16A-D
2. K equals Manufacturing fixed assets FA table 3.1ES.
D. Non-Financial Corporate Business Sector (NFCB) and Manufacturing Wage Share
1. Profit p equals NFC profits 1.14 NIPA line 27, with inventory valuation
adjustment (IVA) and capital consumption adjustment. Also available from line 4
in 6.16 NIPA.
2. K is from line 28 of FA table 4.1, fixed assets for NFCB sector.
3. Y (NFCB) is from NIPA 1.14
4. W (NFCB) is from NIPA 1.14
5. Z equals Y/(cu/100)
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6. Cu is capacity utilization for the manufacturing industry. Years 1949-1958 Taken
from Appendix A. Raffalovich et al (1992). Years 1959-2006 is taken directly
from the Federal Reserve website.
7. Unemployment (U) is taken from 1929 to 1992 is taken from Dumenil and Levy
(1994). It is identical to the data from the Federal Reserve except it has two
decimal points rather than one. After 1992 I use the Federal Reserve data
available on its website.
8. Real compensation per capita (Crp) equals real Compensation (Cr) divided by
employment in thousands of workers, taken from the manufacturing sector NIPA
6.5.
9. Per capita wage equals compensation in current dollars for the Manufacturing
Sector NIPA 6.2A-D, divided by the number of employees in the Manufacturing
Sector, 6.5A-D.
10. Py equals the ‘price per unit of output’ for the NFCB, NIPA 1.15.
11. Pk equals the price index for non-residential private fixed investments, NIPA
5.3.5.
12. Trade equals the average of imports and exports taken from NIPA 1.1.5
13. GDP is taken from NIPA 1.1.5
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Appendix B: Tables and Figures
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Table 1. Marx's Price Calculation as Interpreted by Sweezy.

Department
I
II
III
Totals

C
250
50
100
400

V
75
75
50
200

S (100%)
75
75
50
200

Price
433 1/3
166 2/3
200
800

Table 2. A TSSI Refutation of Internal Inconsistency.

Year
1

Department
I
II
III
Totals

C
250
50
100
400

V
75
75
50
200

S (100%)
75
75
50
200

Price
433 1/3
166 2/3
200
800

Year
2

Department
I
II
III
Totals

C
270
54
108
432

V
62.25
62.25
41.5
166

S (140%)
87.75
87.75
58.5
234

Price
462
161
208
832
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Table 3. Physically determined rate of profit.

Year Corn inputs

1

Corn Wages

Physical

(C)

(V) Æ

Corn output

170

170

510

Physical Rate of Profit

510-340=170.

L=340
2

340

170/340=50%

170

765

765-510=255.

L=340
3

510

255/510=50%

170

1020

1020-680=340.

L=340

340/680=50%

Table 4. A TSSI Defense of Marx's LTFRP.

Year Corn

1

Corn

Corn

Total

Per unit value Profit Rate

inputs

Wages

output

Value

of corn

(C)

(V) Æ

170

170

Output
510

510

510/510=1

L=340
2

340

170

170/340=50%
765

680

L=340
3

510

170
L=340

510-340=170.

680/765=.89

680-510=170.
170/510=33.33%

1020

850

850/1020=.83 850-680=170.
170/680=25%
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Table 5. Replacement Cost Valuation Profit Rate.

Year Corn

Corn

Physical

Per Unit Cost of Replacement Cost

inputs

Wages

Corn

Corn

(C)

(V)

output

Net

Profit Rate
Value/Net

Product
1

170

170

510

510-340=170

(2*170)/2*340)= 50%

(NP)
340/170=2
2

340

170

765

765-510=255

(1.33*255)/(1.33*510)

(NP)

=50%

340/255=1.33
3

510

170

1020

1020-680=340

340/680=50%

(NP)
340/340=1
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Figure 1. Comparison of Profit Rates: 1926-2006.
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Figure 2. Profit Share of the NFCB sector: 1940-2006
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Wage Share 1940-2006
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Figure 3. Wage Share of the NFCB sector: 1940-2006.

Table 6. Descriptive Statistics for Manufacfuring Sector. Ten Year Averages.

Manufacturing Profit Rate
Sector

Wage
Share

1950-59
1960-69
1970-79
1980-89
1990-99
1996-2005

76.81
79.56
82.71
86.45
84.56
86.21

29.83
25.15
15.49
9.61
10.53
8.73

Output
Capital
Ratio
129.81
122.59
89.98
70.68
68.07
61.05

Capacity
Utilization
Ratio
87.92
84.94
81.52
78.42
81.29
78.40

Capacity
Capital
Ratio
145.39
144.56
110.51
90.26
83.74
77.63

Table 7. Descriptive Statistics for Non-Financial Corporate Business Sector. Ten Year Averages.

NFCB

Profit Rate

Wage
Share

1930-39
1940-49
1950-59
1960-69
1970-79
1980-89
1990-99
1996-2005

3.85
14.48
12.39
12.89
8.03
6.57
7.82
7.55

72.79
67.84
69.60
69.68
73.47
74.06
73.21
74.14

OutputCapital
Ratio
39.36
67.86
64.45
71.89
62.96
58.98
64.73
64.48

Profit
Share
8.67
21.05
19.18
17.89
12.75
11.10
12.04
11.68
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Table 8. Predictors of profit rate changes in the manufacturing sector in the United States.

(1)
1950-2005
-.09*
(.04)
-.70***
(.07)

(2)
1978-2005
-.01
(.01)
-.68***
(.01)

Profit rate
(t-1)
Wage
Share
(W/Y)
Capacity
.33***
.14***
Utilization (.04)
(.01)
(Y/Z)
.17***
.12***
(.01)
Capacity
(.04)
Capital
ratio (Z/K)
% change --inflation
% change --MELT
R-squared .90
.98
(adjusted)
N
55
28
Robust regression coefficients shown.
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; †p<.1

(3)
1978-2005
-.01
(.01)
-.67***
(.02)

(4)
1978-2005
-.00
(.01)
-.67***
(.01)

.14***
(.02)

.13***
(.01)

.15***
(.02)

.17***
(.01)

-.00**
(.00)
--

-.00***
(.00)
.00*
(.00)
.98

.98

28
28
Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 9. Effect of Unemployment on per capita compensation in the manufacturing sector.

Unemployment
Inflation Level (not differences)
R-squared (adjusted)

(1) 1950-2005
n=56
.00 (.00)
[.06]
-.00* (.00)
[-.31]
.06

(2) 1978-2005
n=28
.01† (.01)
[.30]
-.00** (.00)
[-.52]
.31

Regression coefficients shown. Standard errors in parentheses and beta coefficients in
brackets.
**p<.01; *p<.05; †p<.1
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Table 10. .Effects of Unemployment, Real Wage, Growth, and Capacity Utilization on the Wage
Share in the United States.

Manufacturing
Sector

(1)
19492005
Unemployment -.023***
(.003)
[-.871]

(2)
19491977
-.025***
(.004)
[1.35]

(3)
19782005
-.025***
(.005)
[-.663]

(4)
19782005
-.01*
(.01)
[-.33]

Per capita
wage (ln)

.746***
(.087)
[.676]

.584**
(.165)
[.564]

.720***
(.13)
[.612]

.55***
(.12)
[.47]

Growth (ln)
(P+W)

-.644***
(.049))
[-1.593]
-.001
(.001)
[-.098]
-.000***
(.000)
[-.356]

-.708***
(.107)
[-2.03]
.000
(.001)
[.015]
.000
(.000)
[.090]

-.560***
(.060)
[-1.21]
-.004*
(.002)
[-.331]
-.000*
(.000)
[-.205]

-.52***
(.06)
[-1.14]
-.00
(.00)
[-.05]
-.00
(.00)
[-.00]

--

--

--

-.02***
(.00)
[-.36]
.94

Capacity
Utilization
Inflation
(absolute
levels, not
differences)
MELT
(Mt+1-Mt)

R-squared
.84
.75
.91
(adjusted)
N
56
28
28
28
Regression coefficients shown. Standard errors in parentheses and beta coefficients in
brackets.
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; †p<.1
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Table 11. Ratios of the Rate of Growth of Employee Compensation (dy) to the Rate of Growth of net
Fixed Capital Stocks (dx).

NFCB sector
1930-39
1940-49
1950-59
1960-69
1970-79
1980-89
1990-99
1996-2005

dy/dx
2.884
.730
.911 (n=9)
1.218
.849
1.404
1.106
.929

Wage Share
72.79
67.84
69.60
69.68
73.47
74.06
73.21
74.14

Profit Share
8.67
21.05
19.18
17.89
12.75
11.10
12.04
11.68

Profit Rate
3.85
14.48
12.39
12.89
8.03
6.57
7.82
7.55

Trade to GDP ratio 1929-2006
0.25
0.2
0.15
Trade to GDP ratio

0.1

Profit Rate NFCB

0.05

2004

1999

1994
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-0.05

1929

0

Figure 4. Trade to GDP ratio 1929-2006.
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Cornell University, where he enrolled in the School of Industrial and Labor Relations.
Due in part to his mother’s declining health, he left Cornell after three semesters and
enrolled at Louisiana State University. At LSU he studied philosophy, religion, and
political science. He developed a particular interest in Foucault, and the historicallibidinal materialism of Deleuze and Guatarri. After three semesters, he studied for a
year at Maastricht University in the Netherlands. At Maastricht, he developed a strong
interest in global political economy, actor network theory, and the Frankfurt School.
After returning to LSU and completing his B.A., John began teaching English in Seoul,
South Korea. After a few months, he and his partner discovered they were going to have
a son. They then fled their company-owned flat in the middle of the night and hid with
their ferret in local motels for several days in order to avoid paying reparations for
violation of contract. His partner was able to return to Louisiana promptly, but John
remained in South Korea for another month, working illegally in order to make extra
money. After returning, he worked as a substitute teacher and as a telemarketer in
Louisiana for a year until being offered a graduate assistantship at the University of
Tennessee.
Today, John resides in Knoxville, TN, and is working on his PhD. He returns to
Louisiana often to see his son, Eli Amadae Bradford. Aside from academics and family,
John received a US paragliding license while in Ecuador. In Knoxville, he spends much
of his free time playing capoeira.

88

